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Distinguishing Judges: An Empirical
Ranking of Judicial Quality in the United
States Courts of Appeals
Robert Anderson IV*
ABSTRACT
This Article presents an empirical performance ranking of 383 federal
appellate judges who served on the United States Courts ofAppeals between
1960 and 2008. Like existing judge evaluation studies, this Article uses cita-
tions from judicial opinions to assess judicial quality. Unlike existing citation
studies, which treat positive and negative citations alike, this Article ranks
judges according to the mix ofpositive and negative citations to the opinions,
rather than the number of citations to those opinions. By distinguishing be-
tween positive and negative citations, this approach avoids ranking judges
higher for citations even when the judges are being cited negatively. The
results are strikingly different from those found in the existing citation count-
based studies ofjudicial performance. When the mix of positive and negative
citations is taken into account, many of the most highly cited judges from the
citation-count studies are only average and some of the average judges in the
citation-count studies emerge as the most positively cited. The results suggest
there is an objective performance measure that can measure judicial perfor-
mance and provide incentives for fidelity to the rule of law.
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. J.D., New
York University; Ph.D., Stanford University. I would like to thank Stephen Choi,
Frank Cross, Mitu Gulati, and Robert Pushaw for helpful comments on a previous
version of this Article and Ryan Griffee for excellent research assistance. I should
disclose that one of the judges evaluated in this Article, Kenneth W. Starr, was the
Dean of Pepperdine University School of Law while this Article was written, and
another, Deanell Reece Tacha, will begin service as Dean on June 1, 2011.
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I. INTRODUCTION
How can one evaluate the performance of federal appellate judges?
This question implicitly arises every time a federal appellate judge is nomi-
nated to the United States Supreme Court. And because the federal appellate
bench is the most common source of Supreme Court nominees in recent dec-
ades,' this question is relevant to most modem Supreme Court nominations.
But the question of judicial performance is at least as important outside the
context of Supreme Court appointments, as the courts of appeals are the final
arbiters of most disputes in the federal courts. Thus, the outcome of virtually
every litigated matter in the federal system hinges on the quality of federal
appellate decision-making, and therefore the performance of these judges
implicates fundamental questions about the rule of law.
However, the importance of evaluating the performance of federal
judges has not motivated systematic assessment of individual judges' work
product in legal scholarship. Indeed, aside from anecdotal information, little
is known about the performance of individual federal appellate judges. Of
course there is no dearth of scholarly critique of federal courts' products - the
opinions in individual cases - but these critiques are not systematically orga-
nized into evaluation of the producers of the opinions - the judges them-
selves. Thus, in spite of the fact that the performance of individual judges has
important implications for the functioning of the judicial system and rule of
law, scholars still do not have a good idea of which judges are performing
well and which judges are performing poorly. Few academic studies have
even attempted to evaluate federal judges using quantitative data, and, when
they have, they have generally received harsh criticism from scholarly com-
mentators.2
The recent nomination of then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme
Court illustrates the de facto alternative to systematic approaches to judicial
quality. The Sotomayor nomination, like nominations of federal appellate
judges in the past, tended to focus on detailed scrutiny of a small number of
high-profile opinions, distracting from the broader, systematic examination of
the nominee's body of work as a whole. 3 In the absence of reliable informa-
tion about judicial performance, center stage in the debate is yielded to anec-
dotal accounts of anonymous sources,4 isolated remarks from the judge's
1. See Lee Epstein et al., The Norm ofPrior Judicial Experience and Its Conse-
quences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903, 908
(2003) (noting that "presidents now look primarily to the U.S. courts of appeals to
identify potential nominees" to the Court).
2. See infra Part V.A.
3. See GOP Homes in on Controversial Sotomayor Speeches,
CNNPOLITICS.COM, July 19, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/07/16/
sotomayor.hearing/index.html.
4. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Case Against Sotomayor, NEW REPUBLIC, May
4, 2009, available at http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id-45d56e6f-f497-4bl9-
[Vol. 76316
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public appearances, and short passages in opinions culled from the tens of
thousands of pages the nominee has written. Although we have the benefit of
a more thorough evaluation from the American Bar Association, its approach
has been called biased5 and may be no more objective than the confirmation
hearings. The result is that the evaluation of judicial performance is biased,
subjective, and based on a narrow slice of information rather than on the
judge's record as a whole.
The frustration with the prevailing approaches to assessing judicial qual-
ity, both in the context of Supreme Court appointments and otherwise, has led
scholars and legal commentators to develop quantitative techniques to meas-
ure judicial performance. 6 The most prominent approaches in recent years
use large databases of citations to evaluate the "influence," "prestige," or
"quality" of judges. One of the first such papers, by Professors Landes, Les-
sig, and Solimine (hereinafter "Landes et al."), used citation counts to opi-
nions to measure "judicial influence" in the federal courts of appeals. More
recently, Professors Choi and Gulati have expanded on the Landes et al.
study, using citation counts to measure "productivity," "quality," and "inde-
pendence" on the federal courts of appeals.8 In contrast to the typical evalua-
tion of judges' opinions that legal scholars perform in law reviews, the cita-
tion literature abstracts away from the details of the cases to systematically
evaluate the whole body of the judges' work product.
The citation studies have revealed information about judicial perfor-
mance that was not previously well known outside the ranks of experienced
appellate advocates and federal judges themselves - if it was known at all.
Perhaps for this reason, the studies have attracted considerable attention in
legal scholarship, including multiple responses to Choi and Gulati's first
9c63-04el0199a085 (quoting an anonymous former Second Circuit clerk describing
Judge Sotomayor as "not that smart and kind of a bully on the bench").
5. See, e.g., James Lindgren, Examining the American Bar Association's Rat-
ings of Nominees to the U.S. Courts ofAppeals for Political Bias, 1989-2000, 17 J.L.
& POL. 1, 26 (2001). For a critical response, see Michael J. Saks & Neil Vidmar, A
Flawed Search for Bias in the American Bar Association's Ratings of Prospective
Judicial Nominees: A Critique of the Lindgren Study, 17 J.L. & POL. 219 (2001). See
also Scott Baker et al., The Continuing Search for a Meaningful Model of Judicial
Rankings and Why It (Unfortunately) Matters, 58 DUKE L.J. 1645, 1655 n.35 (2009);
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An
Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 35-36 (2004); Ste-
ven G. Gey & Jim Rossi, Empirical Measures of Judicial Performance, 32 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1001, 1001-02 (2005).
6. See, e.g., Choi & Gulati, supra note 5, at 26 (explaining that their "frustration
with the current appointment process" inspired their judge ranking project).
7. William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal
Courts ofAppeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998).
8. Choi & Gulati, supra note 5, at 33.
317
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judge ranking paper in the Southern California Law Review,9 a symposium
published in the Florida State University Law Review, and conference pro-
ceedings published in the Duke Law Journal.' As might be expected, how-
ever, the responding scholars and judges have not enthusiastically welcomed
this quantitative intrusion into the traditional purview of qualitative legal
commentary. Although some of the commentators' responses have focused
on very fair criticisms of the methodology employed by Choi and Gulati,
several scholarly responses seem to have a broader point - one that rejects the
very idea of quantitative assessment ofjudging.12
Those who reject the notion that judicial performance is quantifiable
will, of course, be disappointed by any variation of the Choi and Gulati tech-
niques. But for those who see quantitative methods as a valuable tool in sys-
tematic assessment of the judiciary, there is an opportunity to build on exist-
ing citation studies to reveal another perspective on judicial performance.
The opportunity arises because of two key limitations of the citation studies
that limit the effectiveness of the existing work. First, the citation studies are
"count-based," meaning that the number of citations is the key variable of
interest in evaluating the judges. Among other problems, this approach treats
negative citations the same as positive citations, even though negative cita-
tions might reflect negatively on judicial quality. Second, the citation studies
rate judges based only on opinions they have authored, rather than all cases in
which they have participated. Opinion authorship, although closely tied to
individual judges, raises a host of problems, not the least of which is selection
bias in opinion assignment. Constructing a judicial evaluation technique that
responds to these two problems offers a clearer, more comprehensive view of
judicial performance.
This Article attempts to construct such a technique for ranking federal
appellate judges - one that does not have the same drawbacks of the existing
citation-count studies. The problem of treating positive and negative citations
alike is addressed by using "treatment" data from Shepard's Citations (pro-
vided by LexisNexis) to rank judges according to the positive or negative
citations of their peers: other federal appellate judges. Using treatment data
allows judges whose decisions are cited more positively to receive higher
rankings and judges who are cited more negatively to receive lower rankings.
The problem of selection bias is addressed by using panel membership, rather
than opinion authorship, as the link between judges and citations. This means
9. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Be Careful What You Wish For: The Prob-
lems with Using Empirical Rankings to Select Supreme Court Justices, 78 S. CAL. L.
REV. 119 (2004); Workshop on Empirical Research in the Law, On Tournaments for
Appointing Great Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 157 (2004).
10. Symposium, Empirical Measures ofJudicial Performance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1001 (2005).
11. Jeffrey M. Chermerinsky & Jonathan L. Williams, Measuring Judges and
Justice, 58 DuKE L.J. 173 (2009).
12. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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that judges who contribute to producing a decision that is positively cited
when they did not author the opinion are ranked higher than those who only
contribute to producing a decision that is positively cited when they author
the opinion. These two innovations are designed to produce a measure of the
quality of the average opinion produced jointly by an appellate panel, rather
than the visibility or notoriety of opinions authored individually by a judge,
as in the citation-count measures.
Although this project was conceived as a means of building on the exist-
ing citation-count studies, the results are so strikingly different from those of
the citation-count models that this study is more properly viewed as a break
with the existing literature. Indeed, the picture of judicial performance that
emerges from this study poses a challenge to widely-held conceptions about
the identities of the "top" judges in the federal appellate courts. Some of the
most prominent judges in the citation-count models and law review literature
appear only average when ranked by the mix of positive and negative cita-
tions to their opinions. Similarly, some relatively low-profile judges who
rarely make the pages of law review scholarship emerge as some of the na-
tion's most highly rated judges in this ranking. The reason is relatively clear:
while citation counts tend to reward the most provocative judicial entrepre-
neurs, this study rewards the careful judicial craftsperson. Thus, the results of
this study provide a means of assessing the quality of the typical decision
rendered by an appellate judge, rather than the notoriety of his or her high-
profile decisions.
This Article outlines a judicial evaluation tool that is as transparent and
objective as in the method used by Choi and Gulati, but one that more direct-
ly measures the characteristics most people - especially litigants in the feder-
al courts - are likely to think of and care about as judicial "quality." The
justification for this alternative measure is that the average litigant likely
cares much more about the quality of federal appellate judges than about the
judges' passing of an ideological litmus test, or the likelihood the litigant's
dispute will be immortalized in casebooks and law review articles. Moreo-
ver, this approach provides a means of assessing judicial performance for the
purpose of judicial administration that is complementary to, rather than dup-
licative of, the productivity measures already used in judicial assessment,
such as caseloads and backlogs. Finally, by using a much larger dataset and
more detailed information than the existing studies, the quality measures in
this study offer a preliminary but revealing look into the interplay of ideology
and precedent in the federal appellate courts.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II surveys the burgeoning litera-
ture evaluating judicial performance and explains the contribution of this
Article in extending that literature. It outlines the theory that underlies the
performance measurement strategy in this Article and how incorporating pos-
itive and negative citations improves that measure. Part III describes the da-
taset and methods used in this study. Part IV presents the results - a ranking
of 383 federal appellate judges based on positive and negative citations to
their decisions since 1960. This Part uses the opportunity presented by then-
319
5
Anderson: Anderson: Distinguishing Judges
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Judge Sotomayor's nomination to the Supreme Court to compare her perfor-
mance relative to that of the other federal appellate judges considered for the
nomination. Part V applies this research to broad normative policy questions,
such as the relationship between ideology and precedent and whether the
Ninth Circuit should be split. Part VI concludes with the observation that
both ideology and judicial quality appear to drive judicial citation patterns.
II. LITERATURE AND THEORY
A. Introduction to Existing Literature
The quantitative literature evaluating judicial performance is still in its
infancy. Although evaluations based on survey responses have been around
since the Almanac of the Federal Judiciary was first published in 1984,13
only recently have scholars begun to use large databases to evaluate the per-
formance of judges.14 The quantitative work on judicial quality can be rough-
ly grouped into two broad categories according to the study's evaluative
measure. One approach uses judicial outcome measures to evaluate judges,
such as voting patterns and reversal rates on appeal. Another group of ap-
proaches uses the number of citations to opinions from other judicial opi-
nions, law review articles, and so forth to evaluate judges.' 7 In each case, the
goal is to find an objective measurement that captures something important
about judicial influence, prestige, or quality, while possibly controlling for
one or more variables that would potentially confound the analysis. To illu-
strate these two approaches, the discussion below contrasts two recent stu-
dies: the Cross and Lindquist reversal-rate study and the Choi and Gulati
citation analysis study.
The reversal-rate approach is probably the most intuitive way to think
about assessing performance for judges who do not sit in a court of last resort.
13. Perhaps the most well-known resource in this category is the ALMANAC OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1984).
14. See, e.g., Landes et al., supra note 7.
15. There are a number of other measures that have been used for many years in
judicial administration, such as caseloads, backlog statistics, etc. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 146-47 (2008). Although these measures might be used
to evaluate judges, they are typically more applicable to the district courts than to the
appellate courts. Id at 147.
16. The literature on voting patterns primarily has been used to measure judicial
ideology, and it has been examined exhaustively in the Supreme Court context. See
Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The Dimensions of Supreme Court Decision
Making: Again Revisiting the Judicial Mind (May 2, 2001) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.stat.washington.edu/quinn/papers/supctmeas.pdf. Analyzing
voting patterns is less useful in the courts of appeals because there are so few dissents
and therefore little disagreement to examine.
17. See Landes et al., supra note 7.
320 [Vol. 76
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This is true in part because appellate courts themselves invite this interpreta-
tion by describing trial courts as having "erred" when they reverse the trial
courts. This reversal-rate approach involves comparing the rates at which
individual judges' decisions are reversed on appeal (or reversed on certiorari
in the case of federal appellate judges). Assuming that there is a "correct"
disposition of most cases (an aggressive assumption), or at least that there are
"incorrect" ways of resolving some cases (a less aggressive assumption), and
that the superior court is "correct" more often than the lower court (certainly
debatable, but not implausible), then the rate of reversal approach might cap-
ture a measure of judicial quality.' 9 The interpretation is that lower rates of
reversal, possibly as moderated by control variables, translate into higher
judicial quality.
The strengths and limitations of the reversal rate approach are well illu-
strated by a recent study by Frank Cross and Stefanie Lindquist.20 Cross and
Lindquist examined Supreme Court review of federal appellate judges' deci-
sions from 1989 to 2000, computing reversal rates and comparing rankings
based on those rates with the findings from Choi and Gulati's citation analy-
sis study, discussed below.2 1 The authors found that highly cited judges
tended to fare slightly worse at the Supreme Court level than less frequently
cited judges, although the difference was not statistically significant.2 Dig-
ging deeper into the data, however, Cross and Lindquist found that highly
cited judges received more affirmances and reversals by the Supreme Court -
in short, they tended to be reviewed by the Court more often.23 Cross and
Lindquist were cautious about their results, however, arguinq that their ap-
proach "may capture only one dimension of judicial quality." The authors
therefore augmented their study with a cluster analysis of judicial "types,"
which placed judges into categories but did not purport to produce an ordinal
ranking of the judges on a single scale.25
The reversal-rate approach has a certain appeal as a measure of perfor-
mance or at least as a measure of lower court fidelity to superior court prefe-
rences. But the approach has a number of weaknesses that limit its effective-
ness. One defect is that cases granted certiorari are likely a highly biased
18. See Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J.
1383, 1402 (2009).
19. Of course, it is not clear that reversal rates really represent "errors" in any
objective sense, except perhaps in the case of unanimous reversals, discussed in the
subsequent paragraph.
20. Cross & Lindquist, supra note 18.
21. Id at 1406-14.
22. Id
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1414.
25. Id. at 1414-29.
321
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sample of the work product of judges, both in terms of ideology and quality,26
and, in any event, even if a certiorari review is granted for a case, the fact that
nine justices disagree with a particular decision is not necessarily an indica-
tion of the decision's low quality.27 The problem of ideological bias could be
ameliorated somewhat by using only unanimous reversals or summary rever-
sals, but that remedy means reducing the sample size further, leading to the
next, and more significant limitation of the method. The sample size of Su-
preme Court review is simply too small for meaningful comparisons of indi-
vidual appellate judges and possibly even too small for meaningful compari-
sons of whole circuits. Even the most frequently reviewed judges were not
reversed or affirmed more than nine times in the Cross and Lindquist study,
except for Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit, who had fourteen
reversals.28 Thus, this reversal-rate approach may be appropriate for evaluat-
ing district court judges where the problems of bias are reduced and the sam-
ple size is considerably greater, but the approach may not work well for eva-
luating intermediate appellate judges.29
The second approach to evaluating judges - the citation analysis ap-
proach - uses citations by peers, rather than reversals by superiors, as the
relevant data for evaluating judicial quality.30 The idea of using citations to
evaluate judges as historical figures is not new,31 but systematic quantitative
studies of the quality of judges have emerged only in the last decade. 32 The
first significant step on this path was in 1998, when Landes et al. published
26. Whether the cases are biased in terms of ideology or quality depends on
one's theory of how the Supreme Court decides to grant certiorari. That is, does the
Court grant certiorari when lower court decisions are ideologically distant from the
Court or according to more traditional legal criteria, such as when the decisions are
"wrongly decided" in some non-ideological sense, or when circuit splits have devel-
oped? This is exactly the type of question the results of this study can help resolve.
Either way, it seems uncontroversial that the Supreme Court does not choose lower
court cases randomly, so the sample of cases granted certiorari will be biased in some
important way.
27. As Professor Chemerinsky put it, "[i]t is wrong to equate a reversal with a
mistake by the lower court. The Supreme Court gets the final word, but that does not
mean that its rulings are 'right' and reversed lower courts are 'wrong."' Erwin Che-
merinsky, The Myth of the Liberal Ninth Circuit, 37 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003).
28. Cross & Lindquist, supra note 18, at 1407-08.
29. See POSNER, supra note 15, at 147.
30. Landes et al., supra note 7, at 276-77.
31. See, e.g., Judge Posner's writings on judicial greatness, such as RICHARD A.
POSNER, CARDozo: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (1990); Richard A. Posner, The Learned
Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial Greatness, 104 YALE L.J. 511 (1994)
(reviewing GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994));
see also Henry T. Greely, Quantitative Analysis ofa Judicial Career: A Case Study of
Judge John Minor Wisdom, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 99, 101 (1996).
32. For a dated but comprehensive survey of the literature on citation analysis in
studying judges more generally, see Greely, supra note 31, at 10 1-09.
322 [Vol. 76
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their groundbreaking study of judicial influence. In that study, the authors
explored the advantages and disadvantages of citation analysis and ranked
federal appellate judges by citation counts. 34 In the years that followed the
Landes et al. study, a flurry of follow-up studies appeared, with scholars us-
ing citation analysis to study Supreme Court justices,35 courts of appeals
judges,36 state supreme court judges,37 and Australian judges.38
In this citation-analysis line of research, the most provocative recent
work has come in a series of articles by Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati.39
Choi and Gulati's approach is similar to that of Landes et al. in that both use
citation counts to evaluate judges. However, Choi and Gulati updated the
analysis by using more recent data and introducing an innovation to the rank-
ings in the form of an "independence" score.40 But perhaps the most signifi-
cant difference between the Landes et al. study and the work by Choi and
Gulati is that Choi and Gulati explicitly make the normative argument that the
rankin s should be used to evaluate judges for promotion to the Supreme
Court. In brief, the authors propose that the Supreme Court nomination and
confirmation process could be improved by a "tournament" in which federal
appellate jud es compete according to their quantitative criteria for elevation
to the Court. Thus, the authors go beyond the largely descriptive or theoret-
ical work of the Landes et al. study to make aggressive normative arguments
about how the rankings should be used.
The Choi and Gulati studies have generated significant response from
both scholars and federal judges. Most of the response, however, has been
43
negative, and some of it emphatically so. Commentators have expressed a
variety of criticisms, some specific to the Choi and Gulati project or its me-
33. Landes et al., supra note 7.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Montgomery N. Kosma, Measuring the Influence of Supreme Court
Justices, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1998).
36. See, e.g., David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of
Individual Judges on the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 379 (1999).
37. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., Judicial Evaluations and Information Forc-
ing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1313, 1328-31
(2009) and works cited therein.
38. See, e.g., Russell Smyth and Mita Bhattacharya, What Determines Judicial
Prestige? An Empirical Analysis for Judges on the Federal Court ofAustralia, 5 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 233 (2003).
39. See Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament ofJudges?, 92 CAL. L. REV.
299 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?]; Choi & Gulati,
supra note 5.
40. Choi & Gulati, A Tournament ofJudges?, supra note 39, at 310.
41. See id. at 299.
42. See id.
43. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, A Tournament of Virtue, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
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thodology and some that seem directed toward the very idea of quantitative
studies of the judiciary. One line of criticism expresses doubt about the
project of empirical assessment of judges, arguing that it is impossible to
measure judicial performance with quantitative data." Another line of criti-
cism focuses on Choi and Gulati's normative claims and argues that although
judicial performance might be measurable, the proposed "tournament" would
create perverse incentives or otherwise would not translate into better Su-
preme Court justices. 45 Because some of these criticisms raise important
issues about quantitative studies of judicial performance, the discussion of
these issues is deferred until Part V of this Article.
A third line of criticism relates to methodological details of the tech-
niques used by Choi and Gulati. Some of these arguments repeat well-known
criticisms of citation analysis that were extensively catalogued in the original
46Landes et al. study. Others relate more specifically to Choi and Gulati's
methodology.47 The next section details some of these criticisms and de-
scribes how the analysis used in this study responds to the limitations of the
Choi and Gulati approach and citation analysis more generally. Indeed, the
approach taken in this stud was motivated by many of the criticisms of the
citation analysis literature.
B. Drawbacks ofExisting Literature
1. Positive Versus Negative Citations
The most significant drawback of the existing citation studies as meas-
ures of judicial quality is their failure to distinguish among positive, negative,
and neutral citations. As explained above, the citation analysis literature eva-
luates judges based on the number of citations to their opinions - the "citation
count" - rather than the nature of the citations - the "citation treatment."49
The use of citation counts to evaluate judges draws upon the widespread prac-
tice of counting citations to evaluate scholarly influence and quality.o But
there are many reasons that judges and scholars cite one another, and not all
44. See Marshall, supra note 9, at 129-35. The author argues, "No set of quanti-
fiable measures of judicial excellence can be free from ideological influence or politi-
cal manipulation. No set of quantifiable measures can predict who will be an out-
standing Supreme Court Justice." Id. at 135.
45. See infra notes 149-59.
46. Landes et al., supra note 7, at 272-76.
47. See infra Part V.A.
48. Specifically, the literature has not "distinguished between favorable, critical,
or distinguishing citations." Id. at 273. This study does.
49. See supra Part H.A.
50. For an introduction to this literature and application in the law review con-
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of them are indicative of quality of the cited work.5 This is because although
52
many citations are positive, some are negative, and, at least in the judicial
context, most are neutral, incidental, or otherwise not meaningful. 53 Thus,
using citation counts, even with control variables, may not accurately meas-
ure the quality of the cited work.
Of course, the citation studies recognize this potential objection and
some of the studies even acknowledge that taking account of citation treat-
ment would "refine" the analysis.54 In general, however, the authors of cita-
tion-count studies typically argue that it is not necessary to distinguish be-
tween positive and negative citations.55 This perspective is common in cita-
tion analysis of scholarly quality, where the argument is that "an article en-
gendering hundreds of critical comments would undoubtedly be an extremely
important, albeit controversial, contribution."5 But this assumption, although
appropriate in studies of scholars, is often extended by the citation-count lite-
rature to the judicial context, where it may not belong. The argument is that
negative citations, like positive citations, also reflect judicial influence, be-
cause un~ersuasive decisions, at least those outside the circuit, will be simply
ignored. As a result, the argument concludes that the mere mention of the
cited work is an indication of some degree of influence.
This argument needs to be broken down into two overlapping distinc-
tions, both of which are important for sorting out the relationship of citations
to measuring influence and quality. The first distinction is that influence is
not necessarily the same as quality, and citation counts are concededly a bet-
ter measure of influence than of quality, at least in the judicial context. As
Landes and Posner acknowledge in another paper:
[A] common criticism of citation analysis when it is used as an
evaluative tool is inapplicable, or largely so, when it is used to
study influence: that a critical citation should not be weighted as
51. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 422-24 (2001).
52. But as Judge Henry points out, "writing an opinion notorious for being
'wrong' might also lead to many cites." Robert Henry, Do Judges Think? Comments
on Several Papers Presented at the Duke Law Journal's Conference on Measuring
Judges and Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1703, 1717 (2009).
53. See Jake Dear & Edward W. Jessen, "Followed Rates" and Leading State
Cases, 1940-2005, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 683, 687-88 (2007).
54. Choi & Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, supra note 39, at 307 ("More re-
fined methods of measuring citation counts are also possible. Those compiling cita-
tion rankings could assign a judge a positive score for favorable citations and a nega-
tive score for unfavorable citations (thereby curbing the incentive to take extreme
positions in their opinions).").
55. Kosma, supra note 35, at 338 n.16 ("Following past practice, this study in-
cludes citations that distinguish the earlier case because such citations represent an
inability to ignore that precedent.").
56. Shapiro, supra note 50, at 1543.
57. Landes et al., supra note 7, at 273.
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heavily as a favorable one and maybe should not be counted at all
or given a negative weight. When speaking of influence rather
than of quality, one has no call to denigrate critical citations.
Scholars rarely bother to criticize work that they do not think is or
is likely to become influential. They ignore it.58
Thus, negative citations may actually be positive indications of influ-
ence, if the alternative to the negative citation is ignoring the work. When
measuring quality, on the other hand, negative citations are just that - nega-
tive. This is where a line can be drawn between the Landes et al. study and
the Choi and Gulati study. The Landes et al. study and several other citation
studies purport to measure the "influence" of federal judges, 59 not the "quali-
ty" of their opinions. For this purpose, not distinguishing between positive
and negative citations may make sense. The Choi and Gulati approach, on
the other hand, purports to use citation counts to measure "opinion quality."60
For this purpose, treating positive, negative, and neutral citations alike may
overlook the most important piece of information: the citing judge's treatment
of the cited opinion. The use of citation counts to assess judges, therefore, is
much more properly considered a measure of influence, rather than of quality
or reputation.61
The second distinction is suggested by the first - namely that negative
citations, even if not a measure of quality of work, may be a measure of in-
fluence of that work. There is an important assumption underlying this ar-
gument, however, which is that the alternative to negative citation is no cita-
tion at all. As suggested by the passage above, that may be an appropriate
behavioral assumption for citations in scholarship, where unpersuasive work
is reglarly ignored. But the citation-count studies, with one notable excep-
tion, assume that the prevailing behavioral norms in scholarship - ignoring
unpersuasive work - translate into judicial opinions. In reality, however,
judges often do not simply ignore the arguments of the losing party in their
58. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on
Law: A Quantitative Study, 36 J.L. & EcON. 385, 389-90 (1993).
59. See Landes et al., supra note 7, at 271 (explaining the purpose of their study
was to "estimate empirically the influence of individual judges"); see also Kosma,
supra note 35, at 333 ("This empirical study measures the influence of 99 retired
Supreme Court justices. . . .").
60. Choi & Gulati, supra note 5, at 54 (noting that the authors use "citations as a
proxy for quality" and acknowledging that some may find that "outrageous"); see also
Choi et al., supra note 37, at 1321 (noting that the number of citations is used "as a
proxy for the intrinsic quality of the reasoning in the opinion"). Note that Choi, Gula-
ti, and Posner recognize the distinction between influence and quality but argue that
influence and quality are highly correlated. See Choi et al., supra note 37, at 1321-22.
61. Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Stratification and the Reputations of the Unit-
ed States Courts ofAppeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1331, 1339 (2005).
62. See Dear & Jessen, supra note 53.
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opinions, they engage those arguments, distinguishing or rejecting them if
necessary. Thus, the alternative to citation is not to ignore the previous deci-
sion, but rather to cite it negatively. As a result, the mere fact that a judge
cites a prior decision is not necessarily an indication of influence and certain-
ly not an indication of quality but rather an indication of the arguments put
forth by the litigants.
2. Inside- Versus Outside- Circuit Citations
The discussion of influence and quality in citation studies leads to the
second drawback of those studies - their emphasis on "outside-circuit" cita-
tions as measures of influence or quality. As explained above, negative cita-
tions may reflect influence when the alternative to a negative citation is no
citation at all. But even the citation studies recognize that in judicial deci-
sions, the doctrine of binding precedent might require a citation - even a posi-
tive citation - to an unpersuasive or poorly reasoned opinion.63 In contrast,
the assumption is that a decision in another circuit will simply be ignored if it
is not well-reasoned and influential. Thus, the authors of the citation studies
argue that outside-circuit citations are driven by persuasion and inside-circuit
citations are driven by precedent,6 leading those authors to focus primarily
on outside-circuit citations and to ignore inside-circuit citations.
The emphasis on outside-circuit citations, however, rests on problematic
assumptions about how judges deal with unpersuasive decisions, both inside
and outside their circuits. Although most people agree that judges cite well-
reasoned, persuasive opinions positively, what do judges do with unpersua-
sive opinions? The citation studies assume that judges ignore those decisions
if they are outside the circuit, unless they are so influential that they are im-
possible to ignore. This assumption leads Landes et al. to argue that
"[ciritical citations, in particular to opinions outside the citing circuit, are also
a gauge of influence since it is easier to inore an unimportant decision than
to spell out reasons for not following it." Thus, citations from outside the
circuit are assumed to be positive because they are only persuasive.
The citation studies assume that unpersuasive decisions inside the cir-
cuit, on the other hand, will be cited and cited positively. The argument is
that citations from the same circuit are uninformative about influence or qual-
ity because those citations are uniformly positive and compelled by
66precedent. But this mechanical view of precedent ignores the fact that
judges have a great deal of flexibility to avoid poorly reasoned opinions in
their own circuits. Judges may well be bound by those decisions as
63. See Landes et al., supra note 7, at 272-73.
64. Id. at 285-86.
65. Id. at 273.
66. The Dear and Jessen study, which recognizes the importance of the distinc-
tion between positive and negative citations, still focuses on "out-of-state" citations.
See Dear & Jessen, supra note 53, at 692 n.16.
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precedent, but judges can often distinguish the binding precedent if they find
it unpersuasive. Judges' options are not limited to following, rejecting, or
ignoring a decision; judges can, in many cases, distinguish an unpersuasive
decision and avoid its effect. Thus, the extent to which precedents are distin-
guished rather than followed is a negative indication of the persuasiveness of
the precedent.
With respect to citations from other circuits, the mere fact of citation is
not always an indication of quality, as suggested above, or even influence.
This is because when there is no law directly on point - a likely situation in
citation studies based on published opinions - the litigants will usually cite
authority from other circuits. In such cases, the mere fact of citation to out-
of-circuit decisions simply does not communicate anything about those deci-
sions, other than the fact that they favored and were cited by one of the liti-
gants. This is because, "[u]nlike scholars, courts often are not free simply to
ignore authority that is, for example, expressly relied upon in a party's brief,
but which the court finds unpersuasive. Instead, a court often will cite that
authority and in the process criticize or at least distinguish it."67
Generally, when a judge cites persuasive authority from another circuit,
he or she will need to respond to the decision from the other circuit, which
means following, distinguishing, or criticizing the other circuit's decision. In
any one of these treatments, the other circuit's decision will be cited.
There are two broad lessons from this discussion. First, inside-circuit
citations still convey meaningful information if the study distinguishes be-
tween positive (e.g., following) and negative (e.g., criticizing or distinguish-
ing). Second, outside-circuit citations do not necessarily convey meaningful
information about influence or persuasiveness but rather may simply reflect
the generality of a decision's reasoning or the capaciousness of its dicta. As a
result, at least when measuring quality rather than influence, it makes sense to
distinguish between positive and negative citations and to use inside- and
outside-circuit citations.
3. Opinion Authorship Versus Panel Membership
The third problem with citation-count studies is the reliance on opinion
authorship rather than panel membership to assess influence or quality.68
These studies evaluate judges based on the citations to the opinions they write
rather than to the panels on which they participate, because authoring an opi-69
nion is more closely tied to the individual judge than is serving on a panel.
The advantage of the opinion authorship strategy is that fewer observations
67. Id. at 688 n.7.
68. This problem does not affect the Cross and Lindquist reversal rate study to
the same degree, as the authors of that study link judges to opinions they join, not
merely to those they write. Cross & Lindquist, supra note 18, at 1410.
69. See, e.g., Choi & Gulati, supra note 5, at 40-41.
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need to be collected because the random variation of other factors is atte-
nuated when judges are linked to decisions through their opinion authorship.
But as long as there is sufficient data and panel membership is determined
randomly, linking judges to decisions using panel membership rather than
opinion authorship allows measurement of much more than opinion author-
ship, as discussed below.
The advantages of using panel membership rather than opinion author-
ship are that the analysis can (1) mitigate the effects of selection bias in opi-
nion assignment and (2) capture collegial factors that should enter into a
measure of good judging. Because opinion authorship is not randomly as-
signed, the measure of quality may be biased by selection effects. Opinion
assignment might affect citation counts,70 especially when opinion assign-
ment is combined with selective publication of opinions. On the other hand,
using panels, rather than authored opinions, eliminates the concem of self-
selection, as judges are assigned randomly to panels.72 Moreover, this ap-
proach minimizes concerns that critics of judge rankings systems have had
with gamesmanship of the rankings,73 because it would be much more diffi-
cult to game randomly assigned panels than deliberately assigned opinions on
the panels. Although judges might be able to selectively choose opinions to
write or manipulate those opinions to maximize citations, it would be very
hard to do that as one member of a three-judge panel.
The second advantage to linking performance to panel membership ra-
ther than opinion authorship is that panel membership might capture the in-
tangible contributions that high-quality judges make other than writing opi-
nions. Presumably, judges who serve on panels make some positive contribu-
tion in the cases in which they participate, even if they do not write the major-
ity opinion. Participation in deliberations, comments on the opinion, discus-
sion of the rationale, and even the actual vote on the disposition could all
affect the persuasiveness of the resulting decision. Judge Jay Bybee (writing
with Professor Thomas Miles) explains how other members of the panel con-
tribute to the opinion ultimately produced:
70. For example, "[a] landmark opinion in a relatively narrow area of law ...
may be cited less than a mediocre opinion in a frequently litigated substantive area
simply because there are fewer opinions generated in that area." Baker et al., supra
note 5, at 1660.
71. See James J. Brudney, Foreseeing Greatness? Measurable Performance
Criteria and the Selection of Supreme Court Justices, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1015,
1020 (2005).
72. JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS: THE IMPACT OF
COURT ORGANIZATION ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS 72 (2002). The circuits do get different types of cases, and this
could affect how judges within a circuit are viewed relative to judges in another cir-
cuit.
73. See infra Part V.A.
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A judge may contribute mightily to the quality of an opinion even
if she is not its author. A thoughtful judge may ask penetrating
questions from the bench that help shape the views of the other
members of the panel. In conference discussions or in commenting
on a colleague's draft opinion, a judge may influence an opinion's
*74
analysis.
Similarly, Judge Harry Edwards of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit argues that, "[d]uring the course of judi-
cial deliberations, judges more often than not persuade one another until a
consensus is reached." 75 Thus, the ultimate opinion, which represents the
"consensus," is the joint product of the entire panel, not merely of the opi-
nion's author. As Choi and Gulati pointed out in their original "tournament"
article, there is an important "team" aspect to the appellate panel that should
be measured.76
Yet these contributions are not measured by techniques that focus exclu-
sively on ranking judges by opinions they have authored. If judges are
ranked based on the decisions in which they participate in addition to the
opinions they author, the rankings reward rather than discoura e fruitful col-
laboration, as some say Choi and Gulati's tournament does. Indeed, the
failure to capture deliberation, collegiality, and consensus-building is one of
the prime criticisms of those who criticize empirical analysis of judging gen-
74. Jay S. Bybee & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Tournament, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 1055, 1066 (2005).
75. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies
That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58
DUKE L.J. 1895, 1964 (2009).
76. See Choi & Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, supra note 39, at 308 ("A
more complicated issue arises if one views an opinion as a team product. Circuit
court decisions are generally rendered in groups of three. The question is how to
allocate credit (or blame) for the final product. One judge writes the opinion, but the
theory is that she writes the opinion in consultation with the other two judges. Our
tournament gives only the writing judge credit for an opinion. Citation counts there-
fore represent but a noisy indicator of judicial quality. Indeed, in certain circums-
tances, the credit for a superb (or not-so-superb) opinion should be allocated among
the three."). The authors of that study thought this problem might be "unsolvable," as
they argued it would require an outsider to evaluate the relative contribution of the
three. Id. As discussed later, the approach in this Article attempts to disentangle
these contributions without an evaluator. See infra Part IV.C.
77. Choi & Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, supra note 39, at 309 ("A critic
might then ask whether the tournament presents the danger of discouraging collabora-
tion. Will the two nonwriting judges refuse to work with or worse, attempt to under-
mine the writing judge in an effort to boost their own relative rankings?"). Choi and
Gulati conclude that they "expect the competition to be healthy" but concede that the
objection "is a fair one." Id.
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erally, not merely judge ranking studies in particular.78 Linking judges to
citations based on panel membership may help to capture some of the intan-
gibles of collegiality that quantitative studies are often criticized for ignoring.
4. Productivity and Quality
The final criticism of the citation-count studies centers on their prefe-
rence for quantity over quality in opinion writing. The citation-count studies
implicitly favor judges who produce more published opinions because more
published opinions produce more citations. Choi and Gulati go further, ex-
plicitly incorporating "productivity" into their rankings, because they believe
productivity is one characteristic of a promising Supreme Court justice.79 But
by rewarding separate opinion writing in both the productivity and indepen-
dence ranking categories, Choi and Gulati's method may actually measure
negative traits of judges. Moreover, although productivity is perhaps an
important trait for judges on the courts of appeals, it does not seem particular-
ly relevant for Supreme Court justices. 1 Thus, a better approach would be
one that avoids this "volume" measure of performance entirely, which is ex-
actly the approach outlined in the next section.
C. Theory of This Article
The considerations discussed above suggest that the citation-count stu-
dies probably reflect a mix of judicial productivity, influence, aggressiveness,
and possibly creativity or originality, but not necessarily "quality" in the
usual sense.82 As Cross and Lindquist wrote, "The quality judges on the Choi
and Gulati measure appear to be fairly aggressive in their decisionmaking,
provoking more frequent Supreme Court review. They are relatively success-
ful in achieving higher numbers of affirmances, but they also suffer more
losses than the average judge."83 Or, as Judge Richard Posner put it, the eva-
luative criteria in the citation studies "implicitly treat judicial creativity as the
only, or at least the most important, attribute of a circuit judge."84 Although
78. See, e.g., Edwards & Livermore, supra note 75, at 1917-18, 1951-52, 1963-
66.
79. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 5, at 47.
80. Marshall, supra note 9, at 128-29 (arguing that the independence measure
"rewards dogmatism and obstreperousness more than the type of independence we
most value in our jurists"). Justices on the Supreme Court will write approximately
the same number of majority opinions, and the separate opinions on the Court are not
always helpful. Id. at 133-34.
81. See Bybee & Miles, supra note 74, at 1073-74; Cross & Lindquist, supra
note 18, at 1389.
82. See supra Part ll.B.
83. Cross & Lindquist, supra note 18, at 1413.
84. POSNER, supra note 15, at 148.
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these may be positive traits of appellate judges, they do not directly measure
what most people think of as judicial quality, as opposed to scholarly quality
or judicial or scholarly influence. This Article aims to develop a measure
specifically directed to judicial quality.
The first step in devising a measurement strategy for judicial quality is
to articulate a clear theoretical mechanism that links the unobservable fea-
tures of judicial quality to observable judicial outputs. As described above,
many judicial traits, such as productivity, influence, aggressiveness, creativi-
ty, originality, and quality contribute to the number of citations to the deci-
sions of a particular judge.86 To help isolate the effect of quality, this Article
focuses not on the number of citations but on the relative proportion of posi-
tive to negative citations to a judge's decisions. The theory underlying this
measurement strategy is simple: the quality of an opinion's reasoning matters
to judges in their citation practices. This theory assumes that judges tend to
cite high-quality opinions more positively than low-quality opinions. As a
result, in the absence of binding precedent, judges will be more likely to "fol-
low" the reasoning of high-quality opinions and more likely to criticize or
distinguish the reasoning of low-quality opinions.
But what about cases in which judges face binding precedents, such as
those within the same circuit? In such cases, judges generally are not free to
simply "criticize" or disregard the precedent, as the very idea of binding
precedent is that it must be followed or distinguished. But the power to
distinguish a precedent leaves judges with considerable freedom to avoid
decisions with which they do not agree. Judges may distinguish a prior case
because the rule of the precedent does not apply to the facts of the present
case, but judges may also distinguish a precedent because the precedent was
not well-reasoned, although purporting to identify facts that distinguish the
prior case. It is always possible to distinguish a precedent (although perhaps
at the cost of making the distinguishing case itself less persuasive), so even in
the presence of binding authority the proportion of cases "following" versus
85. They may not be, however. Professor Solum argues that "originality" is
characteristic of bad judges, and that originality also stimulates citations, creating a
problem for citation-count studies:
Good judges are clever in using the resources within existing law to solve
the legal problems that come before them. The very best judges are ex-
perts at avoiding originality. And the very worst judges may be the most
original. Very bad judges may use the cases that come before them as ve-
hicles for changing the law, transforming the rules laid down into the rules
that they prefer. This kind of results-oriented or legislative judging may
produce many original propositions of law and hence a high citation rate,
but this is a measure of judicial vice and not judicial virtue.
Solum, supra note 43, at 1393.
86. See supra Part II.B.
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"distinguishing" a precedent will contain important information about the
quality of the precedent.
There is a third reason a judge might seek to distinguish or otherwise
avoid a prior decision, even if that decision is well-reasoned or precedential.
The judge might simply have a preference for an outcome different from the
one the prior decision would dictate. As a result, ideological differences be-
tween judges may account for some negative citations, because judges who
are ideologically extreme may tend to be cited negatively, just as judges
whose opinions are of lower quality will tend to be cited more negatively.
Ideological behavior is often perceived as a negative characteristic in a
judge, and even if perceived neutrally, the more extreme the judge the less
likely others will agree with him or her. Thus, both ideology and quality will
probably affect the mix of positive versus negative citations in appellate
courts.
The fact that both ideology and quality might affect citations, however,
does not mean we cannot disentangle the two effects. Indeed, exploring the
implications of ideology in judicial rankings will be the focus of Part V.D. 1.
Rather than attempting to make assumptions that would disaggregate the two
effects, this Article presents multiple perspectives on the data and allows
readers to draw their own conclusions.
III. DATA AND METHODS
The data for this study consist of 311,931 citations among published
federal appellate court cases between 1960 and 2008." The data include a
pool of 120,906 cases that are cited by other cases (the "cited cases") and a
pool of 117,280 cases that cite other cases (the "citing cases"). 90 Many of the
cited cases are also citing cases, so that the total number of unique cases is
170,786. The data were collected using LexisNexis's Shepard's Citations
service in mid-2008, so the data does not include any cited cases or citing
cases decided after that time.
The distinctive feature of this dataset is that each of the citations is
coded as "positive" or "negative" according to the Shepard's Citations treat-
ment code assigned to the citation. These treatment codes are assigned by
staff attorneys who read the cases and are designed to indicate the preceden-
88. See, e.g., TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 87,
89-90 (1999) (noting the common perception of ideological behavior as negative and
arguing against that normative implication for Supreme Court justices).
89. Specifically, the cases are those in volume 273 or later of the Federal Re-
porter, Second Series and prior to volume 540 of the Federal Reporter, Third Series.
90. The cases only include those with a citation in the Federal Reporter, which
generally indicates a published opinion. Excluded are opinions in which multiple
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tial value of the cited cases.9 1 The majority of Shepard's Citations specify no
treatment other than "citing," which does not indicate any positive or negative
relationship between the cited case and the citing case. But a substantial per-
centage of citations include a treatment code, such as "following," "distin-
guishing," "criticizing," "limiting," "overruling," and so forth. These treat-
ment codes reflect the relationship between the cited case and the citing case
and provide the key data for this study. Scholars have conducted extensive
tests on the treatment codes in Shepard's data and found that the treatment
coding is generally quite valid and reliable.92
The dependent variable in this analysis is a dichotomously coded out-
come indicating the treatment of the citations - i.e., "positive" or "negative."
Consistent with other empirical work using Shepard's Citations, "positive"
codes include the Shepard's treatment of "following," and negative codes
include the Shepard's treatments of "distinguishing," "criticizing," "question-
ing," "overruling," and "limiting." 93 Although the "distinguishing" code is
not obviously negative in the same way as "criticizing," as discussed in Part
II.B above, the citing case is negative in the sense that the citing case seeks to
avoid applying the reasoning of the cited case. Of course, the "distinguish-
ing" code may genuinely indicate the citing case's fact pattern is not within
the holding of the cited case, but those factual distinctions should occur at
random and only make the measures noisy, not biased. Table I below
presents the distribution of each treatment category in the data.
Table I. Treatment Codes of Cited Cases







The parameters of interest are estimated using a linear probability mod-
e194 with a binary dependent variable regressed on a large number of indepen-
91. James F. Spriggs, II & Thomas G. Hansford, Measuring Legal Change: The
Reliability and Validity of Shepard's Citations, 53 POL. RES. Q. 327, 330 (2000).
92. See id.
93. THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT
ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 58 (2006).
94. Although the dependent variable is binary, the linear probability model is
used for ease of interpretation of the judge identifier coefficients. Because this study
does not conduct hypothesis tests of the coefficients or attempt to predict probabili-
ties, the well-known limitations of the linear probability model with binary dependent
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dent variables.95 The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the citation is
"positive" and 0 if the citation is "negative," as described above. This means
that the linear probability model estimates relationships between the indepen-
dent (explanatory) variables to whether the case is cited positively or nega-
tively.
The independent variables of interest are indicator variables for each of
96the 466 judges included in the data. The judge indicator variables (one for
each judge) take the value of 1 if the judge served on the panel of the cited
case and 0 if otherwise.97 If a judge dissented in the cited case, the judge is
treated as having been removed from the panel, meaning that the variable
takes the value 0.9 The coefficient on the judge's indicator variable, there-
fore, may be interpreted as the contribution that judge makes toward the case
being positively (rather than negatively) cited. If a judge's presence on the
panel of the cited case is associated with the case being cited more positively,
the judge will have a positive coefficient. If a judge's presence on the panel
of the cited case is associated with the case being cited more negatively, the
judge will have a negative coefficient. These coefficients are the main quan-
tities of interest used to estimate judicial quality. Larger positive coefficients
may be interpreted as indications of higher quality and smaller (or negative)
coefficients may be interpreted as indications of lower quality.
The model also includes three principal types of control variables. The
first control variables are the volume numbers of the Federal Reporter for the
citing case and the cited case, which serve as proxies for a time variable.99 it
is well known that the number of citations to a precedent depreciates over
time,' 00 and this pattern translates into more negative citations as well - older
95. The size of the data required the use of a bounded memory regression pack-
age in the R Statistical Programming Language called biglm.
96. Although 466 judges were contained in the data and therefore used in esti-
mating the model, only 383 judges, with sufficiently small standard errors, are pre-
sented in the tables below. See infra Part IV.
97. The identity of the judges in each case was obtained by using the
"JUDGES( )" segment search in LexisNexis, using the judge's last name and re-
stricted to the relevant circuit. In cases where two or more judges shared the same
name, the cases were distinguished by date where possible and by first names where
the judges with the same name served at the same time.
98. This is because if a judge dissents from a high-quality case, he or she should
not receive an increase in the quality estimate because of that case, and if a judge
dissents from a low-quality case, he or she should not receive a reduction in the quali-
ty estimate because of that case. The identity of judges dissenting from opinions was
obtained by using the "DISSENTBY( )" segment search in LexisNexis and disambi-
guating shared surnames.
99. The Second Series of the Federal Reporter is numbered consecutively from
I to 999, and the Third Series restarts at 1, so 999 was added to Third Series volume
numbers to keep them consecutive.
100. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical
and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 259 (1976).
335
21
Anderson: Anderson: Distinguishing Judges
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [
cases are cited more negatively than recent cases. Thus, to make the meas-
ures comparable over time, a control variable for the volume number of the
cited case is included. Moreover, older cases also cite other cases more nega-
tively, even holding constant the date of the cited case.ior This effect is not as
strong as the first but also requires a control variable. There is an approx-
imately linear trend in both relationships over time, so a variable is included
for the volume numbers of the citing case and the cited case to control for
time. 10
The second set of variables controls for the effects of inside-circuit ver-
sus outside-circuit citations. As one might expect, judges cite cases within
their own circuits much more frequently and favorably than cases outside
their circuits.103 Whether one attributes this effect to the constraining force of
precedent or to the threat of en banc review, the effect is a considerable one,
as the analysis in Part IV demonstrates. As a result, without control variables,
if some judges tend to be cited more by their own circuit than others, those
judges would appear to be of higher quality than the others, when in fact the
judges receiving more outside-circuit citations might be higher quality.104
The citation-count studies dealt with this complication by focusing primarily
on outside-circuit citations. But using only outside-circuit citations means
leaving out half the data, and it may have other disadvantages as well.1 0 5
Rather than focusing on outside-circuit citations such as those analyzed
in previous studies, the approach in this Article controls for the inside-circuit
effect, which also allows estimation of a separate inside-circuit effect for each
circuit. The control variables therefore include twelve indicator variables,
one for each circuit (the Federal Circuit is omitted because its specialized
docket would make comparisons to judges in other circuits unreliable). These
101. The cause of this phenomenon is unclear. One possibility is changes in She-
pard's coding standards over the years, but it seems unlikely that coding standards
would change year after year at approximately the same rate. Another possibility is
that the increased use of non-published opinions increased the quality of published
opinions. Whether this is an artifact of the coding conventions used by Shepard's
Citations or whether this reflects changes in the legal environment since the 1960s
must be left to future research.
102. To check for non-linearities, an alternative specification with twenty-six
dummy variables for different time periods was run, and the correlation between the
coefficients for the two models was approximately .957, suggesting the dummy varia-
ble specification would not improve much over the linear time trend. It is worth not-
ing that these control variables help to maintain intertemporal comparability but do
impose the constraint that judge quality does not improve or decrease systematically
over time, making it impossible to say whether the judiciary gets better or worse over
time. This limitation may not cause significant problems, as most practical applica-
tions involve comparing the performance of contemporaneous judges, and it may not
be meaningful to compare today's judges with those of the 1960s anyway.
103. See infra Part IV.A tbl.IV.
104. Indeed, this is the assumption that the citation-count studies make.
105. See supra Part II.B.2.
[Vol. 76336
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variables take the value I if the cited case and the citing case are in the same
circuit and 0 otherwise. A thirteenth control variable is included for Eleventh
Circuit cases that cite Fifth Circuit cases, as some Fifth Circuit opinions have
precedential value in the Eleventh Circuit. o0 These variables control for in-
circuit citation and also estimate the in-circuit citation effect - reflecting, in
part, the constraining force of precedent.
A final set of variables attempts to capture ideological differences be-
tween the citing panel and the cited panel, using the political parties of ap-
pointing presidents as proxies for ideology. A panel with a majority of Dem-
ocrat-appointed judges is coded as Democratic, and a panel with a majority of
Republican-appointed judges is coded as Republican.1 07 Using the political
party of the appointing president as a proxy for ideology is as controversial as
it is standard.' 8 Of course, this variable will not capture all or perhaps even
most ideological differences between panels, but the variable does reveal
whether ideology, as measured by political party of the appointing president,
affects whether the judge cites another case positively or negatively. As dis-
cussed below, these variables also help answer the question of the extent to
which ideology and precedent affect inside-circuit and outside-circuit cita-
tions.'09
IV. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION
A. A Ranking ofFederal Appellate Judges Since 1960
The rankings are presented in Table II for the full dataset (column 4)
and five subsets of the dataset (columns 5-9), discussion of which is deferred
to Part IV.B below. The judges are ranked in order from the most positively
cited judges to the most negatively cited judges according to column 4 (re-
sults for the full dataset). Column I lists the judges' names, column 2 lists
106. The Eleventh Circuit was carved out of the Fifth Circuit in 1981. Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1995. In
Bonner v. City of Prichard, the new Eleventh Circuit held that decisions of the Fifth
Circuit handed down prior to September 30, 1981 would have binding authority in the
Eleventh Circuit. 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981).
107. Some panels only have two judges, either because a judge from outside the
circuit is sitting by designation or because one judge died or exercised the recusal
option. In these cases, if the panel is comprised of one Democrat and one Republican,
the data is treated as missing for this variable.
108. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A Window
into the Behavior ofJudges?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 87, 94 (2008). The use of presiden-
tial party as a proxy for ideology has been widely criticized by scholars and by judges
themselves. See, e.g., Edwards & Livermore, supra note 75, at 1909 n.21, 1918-22.
However, the practice is relatively standard. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE
JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 8-9 (2006).
109. See infra Part IV.C.
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the judges' circuits, and column 3 lists the judges' "scores," which are the
coefficients on their indicator variables in the full dataset regression. Larger
scores indicate a judge is more positively cited and smaller scores (including
negative scores) indicate a judge is more negatively cited. Only judges
whose coefficients had standard errors of .024 or less in the full dataset are
presented, which eliminates some judges from the ranking if their positions
are more uncertain because of a small number of observations.o10 It should be
noted that because of the number of parameters estimated, most of the judges'
scores could vary considerably. In drawing inferences about individual
judges, only those consistently toward the top or the bottom of the rankings
can be considered reliable.
Table II. Rankings of Federal Appellate Judges Since 1960
Columns
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Circuit Score: Rank- Ranking: Rank- Ranking: Rank- Rank-
Judge All ing: All Outside ing: All Outside ing: By ing: By
Name Panels Panels Panels Opi- Opinions Demo- Repub-
nions crats licans
Riley 8 0.083 1 10 17 4 48 11
Selya 1 0.082 2 11 7 29 10 10
Straub 2 0.076 3 2 109 344 43 3
Smith 8 0.068 4 23 45 145 8 20
Ains- 5 0.068 5 20 33 46 12 36
worth
Breyer 1 0.068 6 13 57 39 6 33
Motz 4 0.068 7 27 99 119 119 14
Carter 9 0.066 8 34 12 19 29 22
GarzaE 5 0.065 9 133 69 23 13 15
Wallace 9 0.064 10 60 22 176 92 5
Wilkins 4 0.064 11 30 41 31 132 17
Kennedy 9 0.063 12 4 166 98 140 9
Starr 12* 0.06 13 49 78 89 71 2
Ambro 3 0.06 14 36 38 157 27 37
Pickett 10 0.06 15 24 8 81 212 7
Thorn- 5 0.06 16 59 108 210 39 31
berry
Soto- 2 0.059 17 1 29 9 31 25
mayor
Robb 12* 0.059 18 5 28 1 291 6
King 5 0.059 19 22 19 12 17 50
Tamm 12* 0.058 20 7 50 7 42 52
110. The value of .024 was chosen because this was the smallest value that would
include Judges (later Justices) Burger and Blackmun, who are discussed infra Part
V.A.
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McKee 3 0.058 21 73 34 88 82 44
Pell 7 0.057 22 65 137 227 68 18
Skopil 9 0.057 23 120 10 24 14 67
Hender- 12* 0.057 24 17 56 146 162 16
son
Coffey 7 0.056 25 26 9 22 46 38
Leval 2 0.056 26 53 114 168 7 65
Johnson 11 0.055 27 61 112 107 30 95
Timbers 2 0.055 28 89 176 152 5 118
Weis 3 0.054 29 47 54 58 23 134
Russell 4 0.052 30 63 64 87 38 55
Berzon 9 0.052 31 19 42 100 20 147
Friendly 2 0.052 32 57 101 91 26 51
Phillips 4 0.052 33 109 189 251 83 21
Marcus 11 0.052 34 327 149 207 287 8
Ebel 10 0.052 35 29 43 42 146 27
Ripple 7 0.051 36 145 11 41 84 57
Howard 1 0.051 37 3 13 15 1 160
Hansen 8 0.051 38 80 141 167 70 48
Tjoflat 5 0.05 39 155 261 351 19 186
WoodD 7 0.05 40 94 74 132 93 56
O'Scann 9 0.05 41 9 195 68 115 42
lain
Baldock 10 0.05 42 128 81 96 214 23
Nygaard 3 0.049 43 25 3 8 72 47
Flaum 7 0.048 44 135 30 84 222 45
Lynch 1 0.048 45 48 91 90 65 112
Camp- 1 0.048 46 35 63 38 76 128
bell
Rogers 12* 0.048 47 97 53 13 16 100
MacK- 12* 0.047 48 143 88 120 95 90
innon
Wilkey 12* 0.047 49 37 20 55 55 114
Graber 9 0.047 50 21 75 35 172 12
Murphy 8 0.047 51 102 134 280 166 61
Aldisert 3 0.047 52 75 52 83 204 32
Altimari 2 0.046 53 70 72 137 109 97
Bownes 1 0.046 54 198 49 181 57 155
Scirica 3 0.046 55 31 132 136 9 143
Walker 2 0.046 56 54 44 60 176 102
Trott 9 0.045 57 46 238 305 225 19
Ross 8 0.045 58 169 103 133 122 49
Black- 8 0.045 59 312 5 187 365 1
mun
Medina 2 0.045 60 273 217 127 61 62
339
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Table II. Rankings of Federal Appellate Judges Since 1960 (cont)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Circuit Score: Rank- Ranking: Rank- Ranking: Rank- Rank-
Judge All ing: All Outside ing: All Outside ing: By ing: By
Name Panels Panels Panels Opi- Opinions Demo- Repub-
nions crats licans
Katz- 2 0.045 61 151 110 62 99 149
mann
Gibsoni 8 0.045 62 125 136 162 249 24
Matthes 8 0.045 63 295 4 34 128 43
Barnes 9 0.044 64 265 241 281 123 69
Robin- 12* 0.044 65 112 146 249 88 101
son
Burger 12* 0.044 66 225 299 212 173 4
Wil- 7 0.044 67 121 92 95 279 30
liams
Stephen- 8 0.044 68 84 202 185 106 54
son
Newman 2 0.044 69 81 159 101 90 75
McKeo 9 0.044 70 101 24 77 117 41
wn
Ca- 2 0.044 71 182 16 52 87 120
branes
Sprecher 7 0.043 72 55 139 47 4 131
Wil- 12* 0.043 73 40 180 121 192 99
liams
Kearse 2 0.043 74 150 47 108 175 80
Sloviter 3 0.042 75 28 158 65 86 89
Garland 12* 0.042 76 197 2 3 170 74
Adams 3 0.042 77 241 144 253 28 191
WoodH 7 0.042 78 98 80 66 85 126
Roth 3 0.042 79 51 201 197 32 119
Alito 3 0.042 80 64 151 92 261 34
Carnes 11 0.041 81 154 130 250 98 107
Milburn 6 0.041 82 106 76 174 97 85
Tacha 10 0.04 83 147 26 40 194 78
Gilman 6 0.04 84 15 170 50 188 13
Cele- 6 0.04 85 117 48 149 21 205
brezze
Bowman 8 0.04 86 140 82 71 250 40
Cudahy 7 0.04 87 122 113 49 158 124
Moore' 10 0.04 88 131 332 282 94 136
Barks- 5 0.04 89 58 89 21 96 86
dale
Miner 2 0.04 90 105 153 233 15 206
Lucero 10 0.04 91 42 73 14 118 103
Rubin 5 0.039 92 76 187 139 144 108
Birch 11 0.039 93 32 211 186 40 154
26
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Hollo- 10 0.039 94 110 169 115 145 83
way
Clark 11 0.039 95 176 118 170 89 84
Kanne 7 0.039 96 253 21 159 227 76
Brorby 10 0.039 97 86 61 54 139 96
Torruel- 1 0.039 98 99 65 184 240 87
la
Wil- 5 0.039 99 104 163 126 124 91
liams
Easter- 7 0.038 100 152 100 118 309 70
brook
Farris 9 0.038 101 96 107 74 235 73
Ryan 6 0.038 102 52 221 269 329 26
Feinberg 2 0.037 103 108 102 129 186 137
Parker 5 0.037 104 41 119 16 Ill 151
Kennedy 6 0.037 105 190 115 172 181 39
Buckley 12* 0.037 106 161 32 122 161 77
Fagg 8 0.037 107 66 230 93 36 130
Hastings 7 0.037 108 219 258 175 187 46
Cyr 1 0.037 109 163 15 76 231 117
Roney 5 0.037 110 227 1 2 112 133
Meskill 2 0.036 111 111 Ill 110 44 175
Henley 8 0.036 112 141 190 117 49 161
Kravitch 11 0.036 113 79 210 204 74 196
Roney 11 0.036 114 67 240 72 236 72
Bright 8 0.035 115 45 346 153 54 221
Luttig 4 0.035 116 279 192 260 347 28
Woll- 8 0.035 117 149 68 123 201 68
man
Dennis 5 0.035 118 8 66 64 3 226
Wald 12* 0.035 119 177 116 Ill 66 181
Wilson 11 0.035 120 95 215 112 195 104
Murphy 10 0.035 121 85 71 36 78 125
Keith 6 0.035 122 184 275 274 137 105
Hull 11 0.035 123 71 51 230 147 71
Michael 4 0.035 124 77 243 192 125 113
Rymer 9 0.034 125 16 280 223 282 220
Staley 3 0.034 126 138 157 109 2 339
Tate 5 0.034 127 12 246 28 101 148
Bye 8 0.034 128 14 228 82 11 195
Cox 11 0.034 129 144 311 346 257 110
Hall 4 0.034 130 116 281 231 81 211
Clark 5 0.034 131 92 148 70 298 58
Boudin 1 0.034 132 211 160 75 300 59
Hamlin 9 0.034 133 160 121 158 107 35
Manion 7 0.034 134 172 98 114 217 129
341
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Table I. Rankings of Federal Appellate Judges Since 1960 (cont)
[Vol. 76
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Circuit Score: Rank- Ranking: Rank- Ranking: Rank- Rank-
Judge All ing: All Outside ing: All Outside ing: By ing: By
Name Panels Panels Panels Opi- Opinions Demo- Repub-
nions crats licans
Wilkin- 4 0.033 135 159 183 196 330 88
son
Winter 2 0.033 136 164 161 147 73 217
Moore 6 0.033 137 119 152 203 41 266
Duhe 5 0.033 138 205 198 271 62 150
Hill. 5 0.033 139 291 18 150 60 254
Evans 7 0.033 140 44 25 17 47 216
Hays 2 0.033 141 18 97 6 33 305
Barrett 10 0.033 142 178 167 320 80 185
Ander- 11 0.033 143 88 120 163 155 173
son
McLaug 2 0.032 144 212 85 113 91 253
hlin
Bell 5 0.032 145 303 23 213 77 194
Kelly 10 0.032 146 78 147 18 237 106
DeMoss 5 0.032 147 50 172 30 288 115
GibsonF 8 0.032 148 269 216 242 130 180
Wiggins 9 0.032 149 209 206 294 18 311
Gewin 5 0.032 150 323 87 155 102 94
Hill 11 0.032 151 186 173 182 142 123
Hutchin- 3 0.032 152 103 105 94 306 98
son
Guy 6 0.032 153 114 254 296 135 172
Bauer 7 0.032 154 185 39 106 152 165
Briscoe 10 0.031 155 193 286 355 58 273
Kilken- 9 0.03 156 374 46 343 274 132
ny
Seitz 3 0.03 157 262 31 154 67 252
Wil- 4 0.03 158 91 79 56 320 152
liams
Hawkins 9 0.03 159 294 77 124 179 209
McKay 10 0.03 160 56 174 73 216 142
Esch- 7 0.029 161 226 94 67 151 171
bach
Gee 5 0.029 162 162 328 221 56 189
Ander- 10 0.029 163 246 104 143 169 140
son
Mur- 4 0.028 164 222 219 265 50 284
naghan
Godbold 11 0.028 165 83 224 135 136 92
Siler 6 0.028 166 132 218 128 325 79
McLaug 3 0.028 167 82 268 188 113 144
hlin I
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Boo- 9 0.028 168 210 260 218 223 109
chever
Brei- 10 0.028 169 191 213 180 165 183
tenstein I
Wellford 6 0.028 170 118 363 357 63 265
Trask 9 0.028 171 343 257 364 256 153
Maho- 2 0.027 172 201 296 222 100 199
ney
Oakes 2 0.027 173 171 255 313 255 167
Choy 9 0.027 174 194 138 225 248 176
Sentelle 12* 0.027 175 187 142 37 233 139
Gibbons 3 0.027 176 239 93 103 22 246
Lively 6 0.027 177 204 292 291 164 290
Rovner 7 0.027 178 167 106 48 141 158
Garth 3 0.026 179 233 154 216 281 163
HillR 5 0.026 180 33 59 5 326 218
Boggs 6 0.026 181 213 264 293 269 53
Ran- 12* 0.025 182 338 70 226 24 297
dolph
Mehaffy 8 0.025 183 235 282 241 108 166
Godbold 5 0.025 184 228 197 292 114 190
Fay 11 0.025 185 290 333 332 182 164
Niemey- 4 0.025 186 107 140 61 335 135
er
Bryan 4 0.024 187 136 375 374 244 198
Sneed 9 0.024 188 189 177 238 246 162
Stewart 5 0.024 189 38 62 11 323 159
Edwards 12* 0.024 190 257 124 256 211 250
Jolly 5 0.024 191 276 266 331 103 193
Logan 10 0.024 192 123 186 131 322 93
Hatchett 11 0.024 193 254 199 246 138 141
Edmond 11 0.024 194 223 122 44 327 64
son
Martin 6 0.024 195 232 193 142 226 145
Ward- 9 0.024 196 363 316 383 149 345
law
Hunter 3 0.024 197 170 123 134 59 215
Coffin 1 0.024 198 243 40 45 110 222
Hall 9 0.023 199 6 209 27 364 63
Tang 9 0.023 200 39 249 235 177 187
Becker 3 0.023 201 180 244 248 229 232
Cum- 7 0.023 202 158 233 201 185 202
mings 
_ __ 276_43
Field 4 0.023 203 93 276 43 143 237
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Table II. Rankings of Federal Appellate Judges Since 1960 (cont)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Circuit Score: Rank- Ranking: Rank- Ranking: Rank- Rank-
Judge All ing: All Outside ing: All Outside ing: By ing: By
Name Panels Panels Panels Opi- Opinions Demo- Repub-
nions crats licans
Doyle 10 0.023 205 252 290 255 203 235
Lipez 1 0.022 206 358 95 99 52 256
Brown 5 0.022 207 281 165 195 202 271
Hayns- 4 0.022 208 258 273 337 316 60
worth
Mans- 2 0.022 209 240 178 191 64 213
field
Craven 4 0.021 210 236 270 330 221 179
Morgan 5 0.021 211 175 214 237 134 321
Phillips 6 0.021 212 174 133 102 349 29
Gurfein 2 0.021 213 318 277 283 228 188
Bore- 4 0.021 214 247 242 323 232 169
man
Black 11 0.021 215 203 335 258 105 230
Davis 5 0.021 216 200 37 232 339 156
Gould 9 0.021 217 129 128 104 37 356
Ervin 4 0.02 218 148 191 141 163 269
Tjoflat 11 0.02 219 231 171 236 218 201
Peck 6 0.02 220 156 331 329 153 234
Wisdom 5 0.02 221 234 131 144 220 231
Widener 4 0.02 222 292 207 234 345 116
Ander- 5 0.02 223 355 27 365 171 146
son
Fisher 9 0.019 224 381 262 371 45 376
Hufsted- 9 0.019 225 316 347 314 79 342
ler
Calabre- 2 0.019 226 314 156 257 51 299
Si
NelsonT 9 0.019 227 347 222 336 278 301
Mulli- 2 0.019 228 195 60 32 35 262
gan
Webster 8 0.018 229 329 36 105 180 312
Chap- 4 0.018 230 179 150 20 318 258
man
Poole 9 0.018 231 287 129 80 156 295
McEntee 1 0.018 232 153 181 217 126 208
Dyer 5 0.018 233 238 204 79 266 192
Loken 8 0.017 234 208 250 156 368 184
Lay 8 0.017 235 277 323 261 127 302
Butzner 4 0.017 236 215 208 239 270 239
Tatel 12* 0.017 237 275 279 219 286 81
ParkerB 2 0.017 238 217 35 85 243 66
30
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Gins- 12* 0.017 239 300 225 334 267 236
burgD
Hamil- 4 0.016 240 206 14 25 334 177
ton
Vance 11 0.016 241 68 269 228 133 Ill
Daugh- 6 0.016 242 146 344 301 258 337
trey I I I
Moore 2 0.016 243 284 234 278 160 241
GarzaR 5 0.016 244 69 278 302 294 233
Contie 6 0.016 245 320 117 229 210 310
Pooler 2 0.016 246 305 326 309 206 168
Gins- 12* 0.016 247 74 168 10 239 229
burgR I
Melloy 8 0.016 248 249 251 266 374 219
Cowen 3 0.016 249 229 58 33 157 287
Jacobs 2 0.015 250 124 127 166 328 157
Schroe- 9 0.015 251 188 305 349 174 264
der
Clay 6 0.015 252 181 162 183 215 291
McWil- 10 0.015 253 299 125 51 273 270
liams
Smith 5 0.015 254 268 239 252 361 138
JonesE 5 0.015 255 334 182 272 289 203
Van 3 0.015 256 301 196 178 184 316
Dusen
Leven- 12* 0.015 257 319 6 63 121 350
thal
Pratt 2 0.015 258 244 135 160 312 248
Vogel 8 0.014 259 115 372 363 302 122
Flet- 9 0.014 260 370 145 189 53 364
cherW
Gar- 5 0.014 261 307 248 264 208 245
wood
Kauf- 2 0.014 262 272 295 317 238 306
man
Arnold, 8 0.014 263 62 312 215 254 224
R.S. III
Brown- 9 0.014 264 266 317 353 333 210
mng
Green- 3 0.014 265 230 155 97 193 304
berg
Magill 8 0.014 266 286 203 169 264 212
Bena- 5 0.014 267 371 194 303 277 204
vides I
BaTkett 11 0.014 268 216 304 339 224 332
Posner 7 0.013 269 251 236 240 168 278
Rosenn 3 0.013 270 311 247 326 307 182
Gold- 5 0.013 271 298 237 304 159 336
berg I
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Table II. Rankings of Federal Appellate Judges Since 1960 (cont)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Circuit Score: Rank- Ranking: Rank- Ranking: Rank- Rank-
Judge All ing: All Outside ing: All Outside ing: By ing: By
Name Panels Panels Panels Opi- Opinions Demo- Repub-
nions crats licans
Koelsch 9 0.013 273 351 327 379 358 121
Lum- 2 0.012 274 166 293 208 251 293
bard
Higgin- 5 0.012 275 139 313 244 293 238
botham
Alarcon 9 0.012 276 100 314 198 259 280
Smith 2 0.012 277 317 308 202 265 286
Kru- 6 0.012 278 322 294 290 25 322
pansky
Staple- 3 0.012 279 157 188 161 219 288
ton
Vance 5 0.012 280 165 212 347 283 282
Henry 10 0.011 281 126 298 164 205 296
Wright 12* 0.011 282 308 337 333 150 353
Dubina 11 0.011 283 127 143 148 178 214
Bat- 6 0.011 284 113 321 194 344 178
chelder
John- 5 0.011 285 220 232 177 207 251
sonS
Hug 9 0.011 286 199 226 267 247 259
Seymour 10 0.01 287 250 284 273 189 314
Weick 6 0.01 288 304 362 361 303 283
Thomp- 9 0.009 289 271 291 284 341 127
son
Politz 5 0.009 290 267 274 254 271 244
Sprouse 4 0.009 291 337 83 130 352 227
Hender- 11 0.009 292 274 86 59 260 276
son
Biggs 3 0.008 293 218 223 245 198 260
Ander- 9 0.008 294 293 179 190 346 207
son
Suhrhei- 6 0.008 295 310 126 276 199 247
nrich
John- 5 0.008 296 43 67 86 319 362
sonF
Cole 6 0.007 297 137 289 211 209 326
Wiener 5 0.007 298 288 252 288 317 240
Fairchild 7 0.007 299 134 353 279 116 357
Good- 9 0.007 300 349 330 352 295 272
win
Mans- 3 0.007 301 256 184 179 183 343
mann
Simpson 5 0.007 302 348 319 307 336 200
Pierce 2 0.006 303 297 229 209 69 308
Engel 6 0.006 304 302 272 311 290 267
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Hamley 9 0.006 305 278 302 315 191 334
Paez 9 0.006 306 378 342 382 104 383
Nelson 6 0.006 307 173 303 26 366 225
Feman- 9 0.006 308 90 350 277 304 243
dez
Stevens 7 0.005 309 342 315 310 296 274
Van 2 0.005 310 270 318 206 301 324
Graa-
feiland
Wright 9 0.005 311 283 231 297 262 313
Canby 9 0.005 312 183 349 318 354 170
McMil- 8 0.004 313 192 245 224 252 307
lian
MillerW 6 0.004 314 248 371 377 351 255
Porfilio 10 0.004 315 260 175 262 337 285
Mikva 12* 0.004 316 72 235 151 275 335
Brown 6 0.004 317 202 90 78 377 242
Bazelon 12* 0.003 318 321 361 362 285 289
Preger- 9 0.003 319 330 288 324 129 373
son
Leavy 9 0.003 320 87 354 69 148 359
Norris 6 0.003 321 237 220 116 314 268
Lewis 10 0.003 322 313 283 306 276 309
Ely 9 0.003 323 326 256 350 280 315
Hill 10 0.002 324 377 84 299 268 340
Ingra- 5 0.002 325 296 334 316 353 275
ham
Reavley 5 0.001 326 142 325 243 310 319
Sack 2 0.001 327 196 373 376 131 370
Stahl 1 0.001 328 264 205 140 272 328
Bork 12* 0.001 329 353 307 342 380 82
Seth 10 0 330 309 370 370 190 292
Kerner 7 0 331 245 301 53 313 317
Murrah 10 0 332 332 227 263 360 174
Aldrich 1 0 333 221 324 214 362 263
Heaney 8 0 334 263 365 298 154 347
Tuttle 5 0 335 369 285 319 350 197
Tone 7 0 336 130 271 138 308 320
Carda- 2 0 337 352 185 270 332 300
mone II
McGo- 12* -0.001 338 336 164 171 120 358
wan
Rives 5 -0.001 339 285 360 268 355 223
Coleman 5 -0.003 340 315 343 367 305 352
Rendell 3 -0.004 341 361 200 327 348 257
Tuttle 11 -0.004 342 373 340 366 213 368
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Table IL Rankings of Federal Appellate Judges Since 1960 (cont)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Circuit Score: Rank- Ranking: Rank- Ranking: Rank- Rank-
Judge All ing: All Outside ing: All Outside ing: By ing: By
Name Panels Panels Panels Opi- Opinions Demo- Repub-
nions crats licans
Kozinski 9 -0.004 344 261 322 173 343 298
Winter 4 -0.005 345 339 300 289 196 354
Traxler 4 -0.005 346 224 96 125 75 303
Jones 6 -0.005 347 346 339 335 292 333
Higgin- 3 -0.005 348 335 287 200 263 330
botham
NelsonD 9 -0.005 349 359 338 378 167 369
Hastie 3 -0.005 350 259 377 360 200 325
Brunetti 9 -0.006 351 324 309 341 245 363
Norris 9 -0.006 352 242 267 205 370 261
Lewis 3 -0.007 353 280 320 199 34 371
Merrill 9 -0.009 354 350 306 321 311 344
Kalodn- 3 -0.009 355 333 381 372 375 249
er
Merritt 6 -0.009 356 325 352 340 338 323
Beam 8 -0.01 357 344 263 322 359 327
Knoch 7 -0.01 358 306 379 359 324 346
Edwards 6 -0.011 359 367 341 300 234 367
Thomas 9 -0.011 360 360 55 57 315 279
Castle 7 -0.013 361 331 366 345 356 341
Silber- 12* -0.015 362 214 367 247 372 338
man
Cecil 6 -0.015 363 340 336 348 340 329
Beezer 9 -0.015 364 282 348 275 284 360
Ander- 2 -0.016 365 356 265 308 369 318
son
Cham- 9 -0.017 366 357 351 295 378 349
bers
Swygert 7 -0.017 367 328 358 325 297 366
Flet- 9 -0.022 368 375 369 358 230 378
cherB
Fay 5 -0.025 369 368 345 356 342 374
McCree 6 -0.025 370 362 355 338 241 377
Sobeloff 4 -0.027 371 364 329 285 321 381
Water- 2 -0.027 372 365 356 312 379 355
man
JonesW 5 -0.031 373 345 368 259 363 372
Noonan 9 -0.033 374 366 376 354 376 361
Duffy 7 -0.035 375 354 357 287 367 348
Fergu- 9 -0.037 376 372 374 368 357 375
son
Jertberg 9 -0.037 377 341 378 373 331 365
Kiley 7 -0.039 378 289 382 369 371 351
34
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Klein- 9 -0.04 379 376 297 165 381 294
feld
Rein- 9 -0.043 380 380 364 375 299 380
hardt
OSulli- 6 -0.046 381 379 380 380 383 277
van
Fahy 12* -0.063 382 383 359 328 373 382
Schnack 7 -0.084 383 382 383 381 382 379
enberg I
* In this and all other tables, the value of 12 in column 2 indicates the D.C. Circuit.
'John C. Porfilio served on the Tenth Circuit under the name John P. Moore until
January 8, 1996.
The results of this analysis differ dramatically from those of prior judge
ranking studies."' The top ten percent of the rankings (roughly ranks 1-40)
contains some well-known judges, such as now-Justices Stephen Breyer, An-
thony Kennedy, and Sonia Sotomayor, as well as Judges Henry Friendly and
Kenneth Starr, among others. In addition, the top of the rankings contains
some names that also stood out in Choi and Gulati's measure, such as Judge
Bruce Selya of the First Circuit. But most of the names at the top are not very
familiar, such as that of first-place Judge William Riley of the Eighth Circuit.
Similarly, the bottom of the ranking contains some notoriously ideological
judges but also contains some judges who are surprising to see at the bottom
of a quality ranking. Overall, most of the judges fall into a rather large group
in the middle and are not statistically distinguishable from one another.
To compare the results with those of Choi and Gulati in the context of
more recent judges, consider Table 1II, which presents the "composite" rank-
ing from Choi and Gulati's "tournament"11 2 side-by-side with the rankings
from Table II. Because Choi and Gulati ranked a much smaller number of
judges, only 95 of the 383 are presented, with their ranks renumbered accor-
dingly. Comparing the two tables suggests that there is no visible relation-
ship between the Choi and Gulati rankings and the quality rankings as com-
puted in this study. Some of the lowest judges in Choi and Gulati's ranking,
such as Judge Stanley Marcus of the Eleventh Circuit and Judge Karen Hen-
derson of the D.C. Circuit, come out near the top of this Article's ranking.
I11. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 5; Landes et al., supra note 7.
112. Choi & Gulati, supra note 5, at 113-15 tbl.H.
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Table il. Comparison with Choi and Gulati Rankings
Columns
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Score: Rank- Ranking: Ranking: Ranking: Ranking:
Judge Circuit All ing: All Outside All Outside Choi and
Name Panels Panels Panels Opinions Opinions Gulati
Motz 4 0.068 1 6 29 32 32
GarzaE 5 0.065 2 33 19 10 36
Wilkins 4 0.064 3 8 11 11 37
King 5 0.059 4 4 5 4 17
McKee 3 0.058 5 20 9 27 31
Hender- 12 0.057 6 3 17 36 69
son
Marcus 11 0.052 7 68 41 51 74
Ebel 10 0.052 8 7 12 16 6
Ripple 7 0.051 9 36 3 15 21
WoodD 7 0.05 10 25 23 34 8
Nygaard 3 0.049 11 5 2 2 29
Lynch 1 0.048 12 15 27 28 11
Rogers 12 0.048 13 26 15 5 48
Scirica 3 0.046 14 9 36 35 25
Walker 2 0.046 15 16 13 23 26
Trott 9 0.045 16 14 55 69 18
Ca- 2 0.044 17 45 4 20 54
branes
Garland 12 0.042 18 49 1 1 56
Alito 3 0.042 19 18 42 29 16
Carnes 11 0.041 20 40 35 59 7
Tacha 10 0.04 21 38 8 14 64
Gilman 6 0.04 22 1 46 19 15
Barks- 5 0.04 23 17 26 9 67
dale
Lucero 10 0.04 24 12 22 6 65
Birch 11 0.039 25 10 52 45 40
Kanne 7 0.039 26 59 6 39 63
Easter- 7 0.038 27 39 30 31 2
brook
Luttig 4 0.035 28 65 49 63 10
Murphy 10 0.035 29 23 21 12 33
Hull 11 0.035 30 19 14 56 50
Michael 4 0.035 31 21 57 46 66
Rymer 9 0.034 32 2 62 54 73
Boudin I 0.034 33 52 44 25 20
Manion 7 0.034 34 43 28 30 53
Wilkin- 4 0.033 35 41 48 49 3
son
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Moore 6 0.033 36 29 43 50 12
Evans 7 0.033 37 13 7 7 39
Kelly 10 0.032 38 22 40 8 24
Briscoe 10 0.031 39 48 64 74 52
Williams 4 0.03 40 24 25 21 49
Hawkins 9 0.03 41 66 24 33 71
Sentelle 12 0.027 42 46 38 13 57
Rovner 7 0.027 43 42 31 18 46
Boggs 6 0.026 44 53 60 66 9
Ran- 12 0.025 45 70 20 55 47
dolph
Niemey- 4 0.025 46 27 37 24 4
er
Stewart 5 0.024 47 11 18 3 35
Edwards 12 0.024 48 61 33 61 51
Ed- 11 0.024 49 56 32 17 28
mondson
Black 11 0.021 50 50 73 62 60
Loken 8 0.017 51 51 58 38 59
Tatel 12 0.017 52 64 61 53 44
ParkerB 2 0.017 53 55 10 26 62
Gins- 12 0.017 54 67 53 71 41
burgD
Daugh- 6 0.016 55 37 74 67 72
trey
Jacobs 2 0.015 56 30 34 42 23
Schroe- 9 0.015 57 47 69 73 42
der
Clay 6 0.015 58 44 45 44 34
Smith 5 0.015 59 63 56 60 5
JonesE 5 0.015 60 69 47 64 13
Bena- 5 0.014 61 73 50 68 38
vides
Barkett 11 0.014 62 54 68 72 19
Posner 7 0.013 63 58 54 57 1
Higgin- 5 0.012 64 35 70 58 22
botham
Henry 10 0.011 65 31 67 40 68
Dubina 11 0.011 66 32 39 37 61
Bat- 6 0.011 67 28 71 48 70
chelder
Seymour 10 0.01 68 57 63 65 45
Cole 6 0.007 69 34 65 52 58
Rendell 3 -0.004 70 72 51 70 30
Arnold, 8 -0.004 71 60 59 47 14
M.S.
Kozinski 9 -0.004 72 62 72 43 55
Thomas 9 -0.011 73 71 16 22 27
351
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Klein- 9 -0.04 74 74 66 41 43
feld
The most remarkable surprises, however, are probably the judges who
ended up in the middle or bottom of this ranking but at the top of the Choi
and Gulati ranking. In particular, the conspicuous absence of the influential
judge par excellence in the Choi and Gulati ranking - Judge Richard Posner -
from the top of this list is striking. In most rankings in the citation-count
studies, Judge Posner ranks first among federal appellate judges, in many
cases far ahead of the second place judge." 3 In Table 1II, however, we find
that Judge Posner, although ranked first in the Choi and Gulati study, is well
below the median in terms of the mix of positive and negative citations. Si-
milarly, the judges who placed second (Frank Easterbrook), third (J. Harvie
Wilkinson), fourth (Paul Niemeyer), and fifth (Jerry Smith) in Choi and Gula-
ti's composite measure are similarly undistinguished in this ranking, all hid-
den in the middle of Table III. Only Judge David Ebel of the Tenth Circuit
and Judge Diane Wood of the Seventh Circuit make the top ten judges on
both lists in Table Ill. Why the striking differences between the results in
Tables II and III, on the one hand, and the citation-count studies, on the other
hand?
To answer this question, we must first determine why the rankings in
column 4 of Tables II and Ill are so different from those of the citation-count
studies. Is it the use of inside-circuit as well as outside-circuit decisions? Or
is it the use of panels on which judges served rather than the opinions they
wrote? Or both? Consider column 5 of Table II, which presents the results
of the same (panel-based) model based only on outside-circuit citations. The
rankings have a strong relationship to those in column 4, which is not surpris-
ing because they include many of the same data points but still bear no rela-
tionship to the Choi and Gulati rankings. It does not appear that the inside-
circuit versus outside-circuit citations are driving the different results between
the two approaches.
What about the use of panel membership in this study rather than only
authored opinions as in citation-count studies? Column 6 conducts the same
analysis as column 4 but ranks judges based on positive and negative citations
to their authored opinions, rather than on the panels in which they partici-
pated. Again, the results resemble those in column 4 but differ sharply from
those of Choi and Gulati. Finally, column 7 of Table IIl presents the opinion-
based model utilizing only outside-circuit citations, making the dataset most
similar to Choi and Gulati. The results still are not any closer to resembling
those of the citation-count studies. Thus, the differences in rankings between
113. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking the
Statistics, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 19, 21 (2005) ("Judge Posner far outdid his
judicial colleagues by almost every measure we used."). Even in Cross and Lind-
quist, which is not based on citations, Judge Posner ranks rather high. See Cross &
Lindquist, supra note 18, at 14 10-11.
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38
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 76, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol76/iss2/2
2011] AN EMPIRICAL RANKING OF JUDICIAL QUALITY
this study and the count studies result not only from the use of inside-circuit
citations or panels rather than authored opinions but also from the use of posi-
tive and negative citations.
One might still argue, however, that the results in this Article do not
meaningfully measure whether decisions are cited positively or negatively.
For example, perhaps the Shepard's Citation treatments are not as valid and
reliable as the studies have suggested and perhaps the objectivity of citation
counts makes a better measure of quality. To determine whether this expla-
nation accounts for the different results in this Article, one can examine the
coefficients on variables for which we know the effect - the control variables
- to learn how well the positive and negative treatments from Shepard's Cita-
tions correspond to actual judicial citations. For example, it would be very
surprising if judges did not cite precedents in their own circuits more favora-
bly than those outside their circuits, or if judges did not cite other judges of
their political party more favorably than judges of the opposite party. So if
the Shepard's Citations measures did not reflect these empirical regularities,
we might suspect a problem with the data. But if the Shepard's Citations
measures do reflect these empirical regularities, we know that they are, in
fact, measuring something meaningful.
Table IV presents the results for these control variables, one column for
each column of Table II. As expected, the coefficients are positive and large
for inside-circuit citations (including the Eleventh Circuit citing the Fifth
Circuit), indicating that inside-circuit citations are treated more positively
than outside-circuit citations. Similarly, the ideological variables are also
significant and in the directions that one would expect: 114 judges appointed by
Republicans cite judges appointed by Democrats more negatively than they
cite those appointed by Republicans, and the opposite is true as well. Most of
the ideological variables are also highly statistically significant, although
nowhere near the circuit variables either in magnitude or in statistical signi-
ficance. These control variables, all in the expected directions and virtually
all highly statistically significant, suggest that the positive and negative She-
pard's treatment codes, on average, measure exactly what they purport to
measure.
Table IV. Control Variables
All Outside All Outside By Dem- By Re-
Variable Panels Panels Opinions Opinions ocrats publicans
Eleventh Circuit
citing 0.093 0.093 0.119 0.078
Fifth Circuit (.008) NA (.008) NA (.014) 01
0.105 0.106 0.101 0.11
First Circuit (.007) NA. (.007) NA (.014) (.01)
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Table IV Control Variables (cont)
All Outside All Outside By Dem- By Re-
Variable Panels Panels Opinions Opinions ocrats publicans
0.044 0.047 0.031 0.05
Second Circuit (.005) NA (.005) NA (.01) (.008)
0.068 0.066 0.066 0.074
Third Circuit (.007) NA (.007) NA (.014) (.009)
0.125 0.131 0.144 0.12
Fourth Circuit (.008) NA (.008) NA (.015) (.011)
0.125 0.127 0.145 0.114
Fifth Circuit (.005) NA (.004) NA (.009) (.007)
0.158 0.152 0.169 0.146
Sixth Circuit (.006) NA (.006) NA (.011) (.009)
0.107 0.105 0.084 0.111
Seventh Circuit (.005) NA (.005) NA (.012) (.007)
0.138 0.146 0.131 0.133
Eighth Circuit (.006) NA (.006) NA (.012) (.008)
0.073 0.057 0.069 0.073
Ninth Circuit (.005) NA (.004) NA (.008) (.007)
0.145 0.146 0.156 0.133
Tenth Circuit (.007) NA (.007) NA (.012) (.01)
0.136 0.144 0.139 0.131
Eleventh Circuit (.007) NA (.006) NA (.014) (.01)
0.052 0.049 0.067 0.043
D.C. Circuit (.008) NA (.007) NA (.013) (.011)
Repub citing 0.007 0.008 0.016 0.017 0.004
Repub (.003) (0.004) (.002) (.004) NA (.005)
Repub citing -0.014 -0.015 -0.007 -0.003 -0.006
Dem (.003) (0.005) (.003) (.004) NA (.005)
Dem citing -0.012 -0.011 -0.004 -0.003 -0.013
Repub (.003) (0.005) (.003) (.005) (.006) NA
Dem citing 0.012 0.005 0.018 0.017 -0.009
Dem (.004) (0.006) (.003) (.005) (.006) NA
*Excludes en banc panels. Standard errors in parentheses.
B. Sitting Judges and the Sotomayor Nomination
The analysis performed above attempts (perhaps overly ambitiously) to
place federal appellate judges who served at different times over a fifty-year
period on a common scale of quality. This requires introducing control va-
riables for different time periods such that, perhaps counterintuitively, some
judges who are higher in the ranking can have a lower proportion of positive
votes than some judges who are lower in the ranking, depending on when the
judges served. To the extent that these controls are incorrectly constructed,
they may distort the analysis and present biased results. Nevertheless, some
control variables are necessary to compare judges intertemporally in a dataset
with such strong patterns over time. Because some might object to the choice
of control variables or find the methodology less than intuitive, this section
[Vol. 76354
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develops an alternative ranking for current judges based on simple percentag-
es.
By comparing positive and negative citations to judges who served over
the same time period, one arguably can get a rough sense of relative judicial
quality without using any control variables."' 5 This section uses the opportu-
nity presented by the nomination of then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the Su-
preme Court to present such a ranking for the roughly ten-year period she
served on the Second Circuit. The following two tables therefore present a
ranking of the ninety-five active"6 judges who served during the same period
that then-Judge Sotomayor was a circuit judge, beginning on October 7, 1998
(the date of her commission)l 7 and ending in mid-2008 (the start of data col-
lection). The judges are ranked by the percentage of positive citations
(among all positive and negative citations) to the published opinions each
judge wrote during the period.' Separate tables are presented for outside-
circuit citations, a panel in another circuit citing a judge's opinion, and inside-
circuit citations, a panel in the same circuit citing the judge's opinion.
Table V presents the simplified ranking based on outside-circuit cita-
tions and Table VI presents the simplified ranking based on inside-circuit
citations. The results are rather surprising. Then-Judge Sotomayor ranks
third out of ninety-five active judges in outside-circuit citations, with 81.6%
of her citations positive. However, she ranks eightieth out of ninety-five in
inside-circuit citations, with 76% of her citations positive. Indeed, then-
Judge Sotomayor's inside-circuit citations are more negative than her outside-
circuit citations, which is true of only five other judges in Table V. Moreo-
ver, the gap between her inside-circuit and outside-circuit ratings is larger
than any of these other five judges. Even more surprising, the next largest
15. 1 say "arguably" because even if judges serve during the same periods, there
may be factors that affect positive and negative citations other than temporal factors.
For example, such an approach does not control for any differences between circuits
or other factors that could dramatically affect the rankings.
116. This analysis excludes judges who have taken senior status, following the
approach taken by Choi and Gulati, supra note 5. See also Choi & Gulati, supra note
108, at 97. Senior judges are excluded for three reasons. First, this makes the analy-
sis consistent with Choi and Gulati for comparison. Second, senior judges are less
likely to be nominated to the Court, so it makes less sense to compare them to then-
Judge Sotomayor in the context of her nomination. And third, senior judges have a
potentially different mix of cases and therefore may not be comparable to active
judges.
117. Judge Robert King of the Fourth Circuit was included even though he re-
ceived his commission two days after then-Judge Sotomayor and therefore technically
did not serve the entire period. See Judges of the Fourth Circuit, Since 1801,
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/pdf/HistoryJudges.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2011).
118. Citations to judges' opinions are used instead of panel membership because
some panel members will not have served during the whole period and because the
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difference of this kind is that of Judge Merrick Garland of the D.C. Circuit,
who was widely reported to be one of the three top courts of appeals candi-
dates for the nomination that ultimately went to then-Judge Sotomayor." 9
What could explain this remarkable pattern?
Table V. Outside Circ it Ranking
Circuit Positive Negative Number of Outside
Outside Outside Opinions Cited Rating
Judge Name Outside the
Circuit
Garland 12 23 3 21 0.885
King 4 56 12 47 0.824
Sotomayor 2 111 25 66 0.816
Stewart 5 48 11 37 0.814
Dennis 5 19 5 21 0.792
Kelly 10 53 15 49 0.779
Lucero 10 59 17 53 0.776
King 5 65 19 46 0.774
Gilman 6 61 18 62 0.772
Silverman 9 20 6 17 0.769
Wollman 8 78 24 58 0.765
Barksdale 5 32 10 25 0.762
Sloviter 3 98 31 64 0.760
Hull 11 62 22 53 0.738
Loken 8 109 39 80 0.736
Murphy 10 53 19 43 0.736
Torruella 1 77 28 70 0.733
Flaum 7 90 33 82 0.732
Luttig 4 51 19 39 0.729
McKeown 9 48 18 39 0.727
Gould 9 48 18 48 0.727
Lipez 1 77 29 65 0.726
Graber 9 61 23 43 0.726
Black 11 61 23 39 0.726
Motz 4 83 32 62 0.722
Easterbrook 7 256 99 159 0.721
Lynch 1 181 70 119 0.721
Jacobs 2 59 23 44 0.720
Dubina 11 41 16 33 0.719
GinsburgD 12 15 6 18 0.714
Hawkins 9 47 19 34 0.712
Wilkins 4 71 29 45 0.710
Cabranes 2 88 36 65 0.710
119. A number of reports suggested that the top contenders for the nomination
among sitting courts of appeals judges were Judges Diane Wood of the Seventh Cir-
cuit, then-Judge Sotomayor of the Second Circuit, and Judge Garland of the D.C.
Circuit. See, e.g., All Things Considered: Women Dominate Supreme Court Short




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 76, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol76/iss2/2
2011] AN EMPIRICAL RANKING OF JUDICIAL QUALITY
Kanne 7 127 53 94 0.706
Evans 7 45 19 41 0.703
Batchelder 6 45 19 30 0.703
Michael 4 59 25 42 0.702
Niemeyer 4 87 37 67 0.702
Tacha 10 75 32 56 0.701
Ripple 7 103 44 99 0.701
Traxler 4 49 21 40 0.700
Boudin 1 79 35 69 0.693
Wiener 5 46 21 41 0.687
Clay 6 83 38 66 0.686
Barry 3 26 12 17 0.684
Davis 5 41 19 34 0.683
Schroeder 9 28 13 24 0.683
Rogers 12 17 8 14 0.680
Edmondson 11 21 10 16 0.677
Henderson 12 23 11 16 0.676
WoodD 7 94 45 79 0.676
Marcus 11 82 40 43 0.672
Rendell 3 53 26 43 0.671
Anderson 11 34 17 27 0.667
Rovner 7 56 28 60 0.667
Scirica 3 72 36 47 0.667
Moore 6 115 58 101 0.665
Murphy 8 61 31 59 0.663
Wilkinson 4 110 56 85 0.663
Calabresi 2 47 24 45 0.662
Pregerson 9 45 23 41 0.662
Kozinski 9 33 17 23 0.660
Williams 4 61 32 50 0.656
Carnes 11 91 48 65 0.655
Tjoflat 11 56 30 52 0.651
Jolly 5 66 36 51 0.647
Pooler 2 42 23 48 0.646
Sentelle 12 20 11 21 0.645
Birch 11 45 25 42 0.643
Martin 6 27 15 25 0.643
McKee 3 27 15 28 0.643
OScannlain 9 50 28 47 0.641
Barkett 11 48 27 44 0.640
Cole 6 39 22 34 0.639
GarzaE 5 46 26 39 0.639
Kleinfeld 9 21 12 22 0.636
FletcherW 9 50 29 41 0.633
Thomas 9 31 18 30 0.633
Posner 7 222 131 185 0.629
Benavides 5 49 29 43 0.628
Tatel 12 31 19 31 0.620
Straub 2 26 16 28 0.619
Rymer 9 26 16 35 0.619
Henry 10 36 23 33 0.610
357
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Table V. Outside Circuit Ranking (cont)
Circuit Positive Negative Number of Outside
Outside Outside Opinions Cited Rating
Judge Name Outside the
Circuit
Randolph 12 26 17 27 0.605
Smith 5 73 50 71 0.593
Sack 2 59 41 54 0.590
Daughtrey 6 31 22 29 0.585
Boggs 6 49 37 50 0.570
Fisher 9 37 28 36 0.569
JonesE 5 54 44 53 0.551
Paez 9 22 18 31 0.550
Briscoe 10 38 37 41 0.507
Wardlaw 9 19 21 26 0.475
Reinhardt 9 58 73 62 0.443
Table VI. Inside Circuit Ranking
Circuit Positive Negative Opinions Inside
Judge Name Inside Inside Inside Rating
Davis 5 149 13 59 0.920
Anderson 11 78 7 42 0.918
Murphy 8 173 19 113 0.901
Hull 11 282 32 114 0.898
Torruella 1 297 34 184 0.897
Wollman 8 260 30 163 0.897
Henderson 12 47 6 31 0.887
Marcus 11 186 26 67 0.877
Lucero 10 160 24 90 0.870
Moore 6 626 94 224 0.869
Tacha 10 205 31 89 0.869
Ripple 7 350 53 197 0.868
Kanne 7 347 55 204 0.863
Tjoflat 11 176 28 107 0.863
WoodD 7 280 46 180 0.859
King 4 91 15 68 0.858
Edmondson 11 82 14 31 0.854
Barksdale 5 99 17 64 0.853
Loken 8 273 47 139 0.853
Cames 11 232 41 101 0.850
Clay 6 316 56 138 0.849
Birch 11 124 22 76 0.849
Rovner 7 234 42 159 0.848
Lynch 1 423 76 214 0.848
Murphy 10 154 28 92 0.846
Traxler 4 60 11 43 0.845
Gilman 6 321 59 190 0.845
Briscoe 10 103 19 68 0.844
Motz 4 59 11 47 0.843
Flaum 7 268 50 179 0.843
King 5 203 38 88 0.842
Wilkins 4 80 15 47 0.842
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Cabranes 2 165 31 75 0.842
Randolph 12 69 13 37 0.841
GarzaE 5 137 27 90 0.835
Wilkinson 4 86 17 67 0.835
Wiener 5 111 22 79 0.835
Garland 12 70 14 46 0.833
Scirica 3 117 24 53 0.830
Lipez 1 219 45 140 0.830
Boggs 6 198 41 106 0.828
Boudin 1 186 39 109 0.827
Williams 5 57 12 44 0.826
Michael 4 38 8 31 0.826
Dennis 4 57 12 40 0.826
Barkett 11 75 16 56 0.824
FletcherW 9 142 31 82 0.821
Evans 7 128 28 100 0.821
Dubina 11 63 14 45 0.818
Martin 6 130 29 68 0.818
JonesE 5 118 27 76 0.814
McKeown 9 120 28 87 0.811
Easterbrook 7 268 63 191 0.810
Hawkins 9 80 19 43 0.808
Paez 9 116 28 48 0.806
Benavides 5 165 40 95 0.805
Posner 7 461 112 265 0.805
Straub 2 65 16 48 0.802
Cole 6 162 40 85 0.802
Luttig 4 52 13 40 0.800
Jolly 5 151 38 86 0.799
Henry 10 130 34 79 0.793
Kelly 10 166 44 102 0.790
Rendell 3 79 21 55 0.790
GinsburgD 12 63 17 40 0.788
Pregerson 9 137 37 75 0.787
Fisher 9 111 30 60 0.787
Rymer 9 85 23 44 0.787
Thomas 9 113 31 63 0.785
Calabresi 2 116 32 75 0.784
Wardlaw 9 94 26 54 0.783
Stewart 5 140 39 93 0.782
Gould 9 138 39 77 0.780
Graber 9 118 34 73 0.776
Black 11 83 24 57 0.776
Silverman 9 62 18 39 0.775
Daughtrey 6 92 27 52 0.773
Sentelle 12 51 15 44 0.773
Smith 5 231 68 127 0.773
Sotomayor 2 152 48 100 0.760
Barry 3 22 7 20 0.759
Schroeder 9 83 27 46 0.755
McKee 3 58 19 43 0.753
359
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Table VI. Inside Circuit Rcnking (cont)
Circuit Positive Negative Opinions Inside
Judge Name Inside Inside Inside Rating
Reinhardt 9 219 77 102 0.740
Tatel 12 45 16 41 0.738
Niemeyer 4 90 33 72 0.732
OScannlain 9 121 45 80 0.729
Sloviter 3 120 45 83 0.727
Batchelder 6 102 39 59 0.723
Jacobs 2 74 30 65 0.712
Pooler 2 89 40 64 0.690
Rogers 12 42 19 40 0.689
Kleinfeld 9 52 24 38 0.684
Kozinski 9 47 22 40 0.681
Sack 2 71 34 70 0.676
One possible explanation for the discrepancy could be the widely held
perception that both the Second and D.C. Circuits are highly influential and
prestigious outside their circuits1 20 (thus accounting for the judges' high rank-
ings for outside-circuit citations) and less deferential toward their own prece-
dents than most other circuits (thus accounting for the judges' low ranking for
inside-circuit citations). The data presented earlier, 21 however, combined
with the results presented in Part V.D. 1 below, suggest that although the
second assertion is right, the first one is not - the Second Circuit and D.C.
Circuit judges have no higher outside-circuit ratings on average than judges
in most other circuits. Another possible interpretation is that Judge Garland
and then-Judge Sotomayor were writing for a national audience, emphasizing
aspirational legal principles, rather than following precedents within their
own circuits. Finally, it seems possible that collegiality or other interpersonal
considerations enter into intra-circuit citations to a larger extent than they
enter into inter-circuit citations and could explain some of the discrepancy
between the two measures.122
Whatever the interpretation of these tables, it appears that then-Judge
Sotomayor's work product on the Second Circuit is highly respected in the
federal judiciary, particularly outside the Second Circuit. So how does she
compare to historic and current judges in the original model with control va-
riables and the larger dataset? Returning to Table II, we can see that the
model suggests then-Judge Sotomayor is among the most positively cited
judges since 1960. In every subset of the data, then-Judge Sotomayor is in
the top 31 of the 383 ranked judges, and actually ranks first among all such
120. Solimine, supra note 61, at 1341-42 ("Over much of the twentieth century,
the conventional wisdom has ranked the Second and District of Columbia Circuits
highest with regard to prestige and influence.").
121. See supra Part IV.A.
122. See infra Part IV.C.
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judges in outside-circuit citations to panels on which she served.123 Indeed,
as will be discussed in more detail below, columns 8 and 9 of Table H show
that then-Judge Sotomayor received virtually the same rating from judges
appointed by Democrats and those appointed by Republicans. These results
reveal a great deal about her ability to produce persuasive consensus opinions
that command respect throughout the federal appellate judiciary.
The illustration of then-Judge Sotomayor's nomination to the Supreme
Court is an example of how the analysis in this Article makes a practical con-
tribution that complements other judge ranking techniques. This study ranks
then-Judge Sotomayor among the most outstanding judges since 1960, com-
ing in at seventeenth in the primary measure of Table II and first according to
another measure. Although then-Judge Sotomayor was not ranked in the
Choi and Gulati study,124 there is reason to believe that she would rank high -
although not as high - according to those measures as well.125 Thus, then-
Judge Sotomayor, together with Judge Bruce Selya and a handful of others, is
among those relatively unusual judges who perform well according to both
measures.
C. Interpretation
As discussed above, the rankings of judicial quality presented in this Ar-
ticle differ substantially from the Choi and Gulati studies and from the rest of
the citation-count literature. Many of the highly ranked judges of the cita-
tion-count studies are relegated to mediocrity in this approach. Similarly,
most of the top judges in this study are not the well-known names found in
the Choi and Gulati studies. How should one distinguish these scores from
those presented in Choi and Gulati? Is one of the approaches to measuring
judicial quality more accurate than the other, or are the scores better viewed
as measuring different dimensions of judicial performance?
The approach in this Article can be thought of as emphasizing dimen-
sions that are not directly measured by citation-count studies - such as tradi-
tional legal reasoning, collegiality, and careful analysis - and de-emphasizing
dimensions highlighted by the citation-count studies - such as creativity, ori-
ginality, and entrepreneurship. In this sense, the two measures really are
complements, as both capture potentially important qualities in a judge and
123. The reason Judge Merrick Garland rates lower on this measure is that the
Table 11 measure is based on panels, not opinions, as was the case in Table V. Judge
Garland ranks higher in Table 11 according to citations to his opinions. Judge Robert
King was not included in Table II because the standard error for his coefficient was
too large. He would have ranked second according to that measure, however, out-
ranking both Judge Garland and then-Judge Sotomayor.
124. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 5, at 113-15 tbl.H.
125. Eric Posner has conducted a rough count for a blog posting. See Posting of
Eric Posner to the Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/1243482653.shtml
(May 27, 2009, 23:50 EST).
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use a similar methodology, even though they produce radically different as-
sessments of the performance of federal appellate judges.
The idea that a quantitative methodology could measure intangible qual-
ities like collegiality is certainly controversial. But what is probably not con-
troversial is that to the extent collegiality is measured by citation analysis,
this study measures collegiality better than the citation-count studies. The
first reason is that inside-circuit citations are more likely to assess collegiali-
ty, temperament, and the like than are outside-circuit citations, and this study
places equal emphasis on both inside- and outside-circuit citations. Second,
the use of panel membership, rather than opinion authorship, to link judges to
citations may allow this analysis to capture collegiality in a way that citations
to authored opinions do not. This is because linking judges to cases through
panel participation rewards judges who positively contribute to a joint, rather
than an individual, intellectual product. This idea of contributing to a joint
intellectual product is much of what collegiality in appellate courts is (or
should be) about.
This potential to capture intangible aspects of collegiality in a quantita-
tive measure may be useful for Supreme Court appointments, as commenta-
tors have identified the ability to influence other members in a group deci-
sion-making situation as an important part of success at the Supreme Court
level.126 The argument is that "[j]udges in conference who carefully engage
and evaluate the arguments and explanations offered by their colleagues are
likely to create a better informed and intellectually more rigorous final prod-
uct even if no one's vote is changed during deliberations."1 27 This "final
product" is exactly what other judges evaluate when they decide to cite a
decision positively or negatively. Therefore, to the extent a judge contributes
positively to that "final product" when he or she is not writing the opinion,
the judge exhibits the valuable traits that are often referred to as collegiality.
As a result, the use of panel membership in this study arguably reflects some
of the intangible qualities of good judges that are often collectively referred to
as "collegiality." 8 Thus, while quantitative approaches may never supplant
more traditional means of evaluating intangible qualities, such as the ABA
evaluation for integrity and judicial temperament, 29 it may be that quantita-
tive approaches can capture some intangible qualities as well.
126. Brudney, supra note 71, at 1045-47.
127. Id. at 1045.
128. See id. at 1046-47.
129. The ABA evaluates candidates in terms of integrity, professional compe-
tence, and judicial temperament. American Bar Association, American Bar Associa-
tion Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary: What It Is and How It Works, 17 J.L.
& POL. 215, 215 (2001). Arguably, the comprehensive approach to judicial evalua-
tion in this Article evaluates the judicial competence of a federal appellate judge
much more fairly and systematically than does the ABA process. The approach in
this Article has little or nothing to say about a judge's integrity or temperament, ex-
362 [Vol. 76
48
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 76, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol76/iss2/2
20111 AN EMPIRICAL RANKING OF JUDICIAL QUALITY
The second dimension that is captured better by this approach than the
citation-count studies is a judge's ability to persuasively argue from tradition-
al legal materials and engage in traditional legal reasoning. This dimension
is, in a sense, an alternative to the qualities the citation-count studies emphas-
ize - creativity, originality, and entrepreneurship - that are in some ways the
opposite of traditional legal reasoning. As Cross and Lindquist observed,
"[t]here is reason to think that the Choi and Gulati results capture an inclina-
tion toward judicial entrepreneurship. One might expect such ,udges to be
more frequently cited because they strive to make the law."I Similarly,
another commentator notes that the citation-count approach "might encourage
judges to use novel reasoning or reach at ical conclusions so as to increase
the number of citations to their opinions."
The willingness or reluctance of individual judges to aggressively
"make the law" appears to be an important part of what the rankings in this
Article are measuring. As an illustration, cases in which the appellate panel
reverses a lower court decision are cited much more negatively than cases in
which the appellate panel affirms a lower court decision.1 32 Indeed, this ef-
fect is considerably larger than the effect of the political parties of the presi-
dents who appointed the judges, or almost any other single variable in the
analysis. To the extent that a reversal of a district court tends to be more ag-
gressive or entrepreneurial than an affirmance, this pattern supports the inter-
pretation above.
The criticism that emerges from the emphasis on creativity and novelty
is that "novel opinions are not necessarily better opinions."1 33 Gulati, Choi
and (Eric) Posner summarize this criticism (with which they disagree) as fol-
lows:
Citation counts, the argument goes, likely reward judges who are
more creative and expansive in their articulations of the law, since
courts are more likely to cite such articulations. If anything, high
cept to the extent those qualities are known to and taken into account by federal
judges in citing one another.
130. Cross & Lindquist, supra note 18, at 1421.
131. Ahmed E. Taha, Information and the Selection ofJudges: A Comment on "A
Tournament ofJudges ", 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1401, 1408 (2005).
132. When the analysis in this Article was augmented with data on whether the
cited decision reversed or affirmed the lower court, the results suggested that reversals
were cited much more negatively than affirmances. This is consistent with what
Frank Cross has found in his work on the courts of appeals. See FRANK B. CROSS,
DECISION MAKING ON THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 214-15 (2007). I would like to
thank Frank Cross for the suggestion to test the effect of the disposition of the lower
court on the citation of the appellate opinion.
133. Taha, supra note 131, at 1408.
363
49
Anderson: Anderson: Distinguishing Judges
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
citation counts may be a measure of bad judging if the "better" ap-
proach to lawmaking is to decide cases narrowly. 134
This is a very fair description of the criticism, but their response is ulti-
mately unpersuasive. They respond with the economic argument that "if
judges value minimalism, then minimalist opinions will be cited more, not the
creative and expansive ones."' 3 5 As explained above, this may make sense if
the judges are cited positively, but expansive opinions are particularly likely
to require distinguishing so that, while they receive many citations, they are
negative citations.136 Again, judges do not necessarily cite opinions because
they "value" them; they often cite them because the litigants' briefs rely on
them.
In contrast to the citation-count approach, which may "encourage judges
to use novel reasoning or reach atypical conclusions,"' 37 this Article evaluates
judges' ability to use traditional reasoning to reach predictable conclusions.
The Choi and Gulati rankings may favor more aggressive judicial theorizing
- judges who have sweeping, encompassing theories of how cases should be
resolved but not necessarily the time or inclination to work out all of the de-
tails. The Choi and Gulati approach also rewards judges only for the opinions
they actually author, implicitly depreciating the panel's other judges' contri-
butions in producing a well-reasoned decision. The approach in this Article
takes a different perspective, rewarding judges for a combination of precise
analysis, careful decision-making, and collegiality, whether the judge wrote
the opinion or simply participated in the joint intellectual product of an appel-
late panel.
The comments in this section are not intended to diminish the value of
the citation-count approach but rather to emphasize the complementarity of
the two approaches. Part of the problem with the citation studies is that, al-
though they use similar methods, they variously refer to their measurements
as "prestige," "influence," "reputation," or "quality," typicall' without defin-
ing these terms or elucidating the distinctions between them.' As Cross and
134. Choi et al., supra note 37, at 1322 (footnote omitted).
135. Id.
136. The measures in this Article may actually favor judicial maximalists - those
who write highly general opinions. This is because "distinguishing" citations are
negative, and it may be more difficult to distinguish a highly general opinion. Frede-
rick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 594 (1987) ("Although it will always
be possible to distinguish a precedent, this becomes comparatively harder if we de-
scribe and use the precedents of the past in general terms."). But this effect is more
likely to appear within the circuit than outside the circuit. This is because outside-
circuit citations can simply reject ("criticize" in the language of Shepard's) the broad-
ly-worded opinion. This must be left for further research.
137. See Taha, supra note 131, at 1408.
138. A notable exception is Klein and Morrisroe, who define "influence" as "the
extent to which the actions of one person have an effect on the views or behavior of
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Lindquist point out, "the Choi and Gulati quality measures may implicitly
presume that judicial entrepreneurship is associated with judicial quality, a
presumption they do not support."' 3 The characteristics measured by the
Choi and Gulati approach, including influence, prestige, productivity, creativ-
ity, and the like are valuable traits in federal appellate judges and worthwhile
to measure, but they are not the same as judicial quality. Although it is un-
clear whether a citation study can distinguish between influence and pres-
tige,140 a citation study can distinguish to some extent between influence and
quality. Both of these traits may be relevant to evaluating judges in certain
contexts, and while the count studies focus on influence, this study focuses on
quality.
V. CuiIcisMs OF QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT AND
NORMATIVE APPLICATION
The use of quantitative methods to evaluate judges is highly controver-
sial, as the commentators' responses to the Choi and Gulati study demon-
strate. Although some of the commentators raised specific methodological
objections to Choi and Gulati's work, many commentators' responses were
more of a general demurrer, dismissing the very idea of quantifying judicial
performance.141 Indeed, there appears to be a relatively large group of scho-
lars opposed to the very idea of quantification of judicial performance. But
the increasing availability of data on the courts means that judicial quantifica-
tion projects are here to stay.142 This Part, therefore, attempts to address
some of the general criticisms of the project of evaluating judges with quan-
titative data. It also tries to show how quantitative assessment might be used
in ways other than Supreme Court nomination and confirmation, which is
where the most controversy seems to have arisen.
A. Three Types of Criticisms of Citation Studies
The skeptics of the Choi and Gulati and other citation approaches pri-
marily advance three related arguments as a criticism of ranking judges with
others" and "prestige" as "the amount of respect, regard, or esteem one enjoys among
one's fellows." Klein & Morrisroe, supra note 36, at 371-72.
139. Cross & Lindquist, supra note 18, at 1421.
140. See Smyth & Bhattacharya, supra note 38, at 236.
141. Apparently this type of criticism is not new; it accompanied the older studies
as well. See, e.g., Greely, supra note 31, at 107 (describing the furor associated with
Posner's use of citation analysis to study Benjamin Cardozo).
142. Baker et al., supra note 5, at 1646 ("Judicial rankings, for better or worse, are
not going away. Therefore, there is a strong need to develop meaningful and appro-
priate measures for evaluation.").
365
51
Anderson: Anderson: Distinguishing Judges
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
citations.143 The first is that even if the Choi and Gulati studies measure qual-
ity at the appellate court level, good appellate judges do not necessarily trans-
late into good Supreme Court justices. The second is that even if the rankings
measure good appellate judges and good appellate judges do make good Su-
preme Court justices, ranking the judges may cause judges to change their
behavior to "game" the system'" or otherwise produce undesirable conse-
quences. The third is that the ranking system may provide "cover" for ideo-
logical appointments instead of avoiding them. 145 This Part addresses each of
these criticisms in turn.
The first of these claims is that appellate quality may not translate into
Supreme Court quality. Supreme Court justices and federal appellate justices
do different jobs, and scholars have argued that successful appellate judges do
not necessarily make "great" Supreme Court justices.146 James Brudney illu-
strates this in his response to Choi and Gulati's article by using an analysis
similar to that of Choi and Gulati to compare Justices Burger and Blackmun
as appellate judges. He concludes that then-Judge Burger looked better than
then-Judge Blackmun on most of Choi and Gulati's measures,147 whereas
most scholars see Blackmun as the greater justice. 14  Similarly, analysis in
this Article sees Blackmun (ranked 59 in column 4) and Burger (ranked 66)
as essentially the same in almost all areas, with the exception of the ranking
by opinions, where Blackmun excelled (ranked 5) and Burger struggled
(ranked 299). But quantitative studies would have had difficulty predicting
the different trajectories of the two men's lives.
Comparing the two approaches, these objections are probably at least as
applicable to the analysis in this Article as to the citation-count approach,
because this analysis is more calibrated to measure a judge's quality as an
appellate judge. The Supreme Court has a discretionary docket, which has
the result that in the Supreme Court "the impact of precedent is diminished,
and the importance of collegial interaction increased" relative to the appellate
courts.149 But this fact cuts both ways in evaluating the usefulness of this
Article's approach for evaluating potential nominees for the Supreme Court.
On the one hand, because this Article's approach probably measures adhe-
rence to precedent more than the citation-count approach, the approach here
is perhaps less suited to evaluating potential Supreme Court nominees than
the citation-count approach. However, because this Article probably meas-
143. Indeed, these are the three organizing themes of the response by Judge Bybee
and Thomas Miles. See Bybee & Miles, supra note 74, at 1058.
144. See, e.g., id. at 1070-72; Marshall, supra note 9, at 122-23.
145. Marshall, supra note 9, at 130-32.
146. Steven Goldberg, Federal Judges and the Heisman Trophy, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1237, 1241-42 (2005).
147. Brudney, supra note 71, at 1028-29.
148. Duane Benton & Barrett J. Vahle, The Burger-Blackmun Relationship: Les-
sons for Collegiality from the Blackmun Papers, 70 Mo. L. REv. 995 (2005).
149. Brudney, supra note 71, at 1037-38.
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ures "collegial interaction" more effectively than the citation-count approach,
the approach here might be more appropriate for evaluating potential Su-
preme Court nominees.
Moreover, even though the jobs of appellate judges differ from those of
Supreme Court justices, the ability to do one well is probably still an indica-
tion of an ability to do the other well. The jobs are not that different, after all,
and unless one thinks that a particular person is innately suited to one court or
the other, good performance at the appellate level may just mean understand-
ing and abiding by the different roles that judges have at different levels.
When the judge transitions to the role of a Supreme Court justice, he or she
transitions to a new role that measures performance criteria differently. It
may be that no quantitative method could predict that Justices Burger and
Blackmun would part company as they did but most likely neither could any
qualitative method, so the criticism really does not have much persuasive
force.
The second criticism - that rankings will encourage attempts to game
the system or otherwise create perverse incentives - is addressed separately
by most of the commentators but is analytically very similar to the first criti-
cism. Under this view, judges will change their behavior to focus on the su-
perficial measures used in the rankings, shifting effort away from unobserva-
ble but high-value activities toward observable but low-value activities. Spe-
cifically, judges could potentially increase their rankings in the Choi and Gu-
lati framework by publishing more of their decisions, whether or not those
decisions add anything to the law, and by writing more concurring and dis-
senting opinions.150 Although this is sometimes considered "gaming the sys-
tem" or creating bad incentives,' 5 the two are really the same. The very idea
of "gaming the system" means having incentives behave in ways that are
positive in the rankings but otherwise undesirable. Conversely, if the change
in behavior were desirable, it would not be called "gaming the system," but
rather "responding to positive incentives to perform well," which is part of
what Choi and Gulati hoped to encourage.
Whatever the incentive problem is called, the criticism is basically the
same. Judges would be stimulated to behave in undesirable ways, particular-
ly along the "productivity" dimension of the rankings, because that is "the
easiest dimension to manipulate."l 52 This could produce a situation where, as
Professor Solum put it: "A tournament of judges would be won by judges
who possess arbitrary luck and the vices of originality and mindless produc-
tivity; the contest would be lost by those who possess the virtues of justice
and wisdom. The judicial selection process should not be transformed into a
150. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 9, at 122-23.
151. See Baker et al., supra note 5, at 1662-64; Bruce M. Selya, Pulling From the
Ranks?: Remarks on the Proposed Use of an Objective Judicial Ranking System to
Guide the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1281, 1292-95
(2005); Solum, supra note 43.
152. Bybee & Miles, supra note 74, at 1070.
367
53
Anderson: Anderson: Distinguishing Judges
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
game."' 5 3 Although Solum's criticism about gaming the system may have
some leverage as a criticism of Choi and Gulati's approach, it really would
not apply to the approach in this study. Productivity counts for nothing in the
quality ranking developed here, eliminating one of the major criticisms of the
Choi and Gulati approach. In addition, as already discussed, the "vice of
originality" is most likely a handicap, not an advantage, when judges are
ranked on the basis of the mix of positive and negative citations.
The productivity ranking is not the only manipulable component of the
Choi and Gulati formula, however. The "quality" ranking is also manipulable
as Judge Selya points out:
Any judge worth his salt will tell you that there are ways to write
opinions that make citation more likely. Judges can boost citation
rates by writing longer opinions, publishing opinions that would
otherwise go unpublished, eschewing quotations, taking controver-
sial positions, or reaching for novel issues at the margin of a case.
Accordingly, frequency of citation sometimes may signal better
strategy rather than better quality. 154
Professor Solum identifies a similar concern, arguing that under Choi
and Gulati's approach, "[j]udges will have an incentive to change the law,
because an opinion that makes new law - especially new law on a topic that
arises frequently - is much more likely to be cited than an opinion that merely
restates existing law." 55
Although these are certainly risks in the citation-count framework, they
do not apply to the ranking in this Article. Each of the proposed mani ula-
tions would actually work against the judge's ranking in this study. A
judge who "tak[es] controversial positions," "reach[es] for novel issues," or
"makes new law"' 57 will in fact generate many citations - including many
positive citations - but will tip the balance toward negative, rather than posi-
tive citations. That balance is exactly what is measured in this Article.
Moreover, the approach taken here, as opposed to that in Choi and Gulati,
actually elevates some of Professor Solum's "judicial virtues" as the prime
measurements of quality for judges.'58 The rankings developed here are par-
ticularly likely to reflect what Solum calls "diligence," "carefulness," and
"judicial craft," favoring the judge who "follows the law rather than makes
153. Solum, supra note 43, at 1366.
154. Selya, supra note 151, at 1290.
155. Solum, supra note 43, at 1396.
156. The "longer opinion" factor is a possible exception, as it is not clear which
way this factor works. It would seem longer opinions have a higher chance of being
cited for something, but it is unknown whether they would be cited more positively or
more negatively.
157. Choi & Gulati, supra note 5, at 113-15 tbl.H.
158. See Solum, supra note 43, at 1376-85.
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it."' 59 As a result, the incentives created by the rankings in this study - to be
more positively cited than negatively cited - are not only more difficult to
manipulate than citation counts but also create more positive incentives, even
as interpreted by critics of Choi and Gulati.
The third criticism commonly leveled against Choi and Gulati's rank-
ings is that the rankings will actually provide "cover" for such appointments
rather than eliminate ideological appointments. 160 The risk is that the appear-
ance of objectivity provided by a ranking system might allow a president to
appoint a judge who is highly ideological, stifling the criticism that would
otherwise attend such a nominee. It turns out, however, that, at least when
using the ranking developed in this Article, ideological judges do not score
very high. Indeed, there appears to be a trade-off between ideology and qual-
ity as measured here that makes this criticism inapplicable to the rankings in
this Article. This trade-off is developed more fully in Part V.D. 1 below.
Finally, in assessing these criticisms, it is important to keep in mind the
relevant standards to which one would compare a judicial evaluation ap-
proach: first, what is the alternative to the use of quantitative assessment in
Supreme Court appointments, and second, what is the ideal for such appoint-
ments? The alternative is essentially the status quo. Because the public has
no realistic way to evaluate judicial candidates, positions on "hot-button"
issues have been the test:
In the end, the real mettle of a potential nominee to the Court lies
in her opinions and character. Reading opinions (much less dis-
cerning character), however, is time-consuming and, hence, costly.
It is, moreover, an inexact science. For members of the public
without legal training, comprehending the often complex legal
analysis of a judicial opinion is prohibitive. The public has turned
instead to a less costly means of evaluating judicial nominees -
looking at a nominee's positions on what Professors Choi and Gu-
lati call the "hot button issues," such as abortion, gun rights, affir-
mative action, and capital punishment, among others.'61
These are important issues, and the argument is not that the candidate's
position on these issues is unimportant or irrelevant. The point is that these
issues really serve as a proxy for something that is harder to measure - the
prospective nominee's opinions and character, which are too difficult to di-
rectly observe.
Because the alternative to quantitative assessment is largely the status
quo, this requires detailed inquiry into a small number of high-profile opi-
159. Id. at 1374-76, 1393.
160. Selya, supra note 151, at 1286 (arguing that the "ranking system may serve
to provide an impenetrable cover for an essentially ideological choice").
161. Bybee & Miles, supra note 74, at 1056.
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nions. But what is the ideal? The above quotation suggests that ideally, a
group of intelligent, objective experts would read each of the judge's opi-
nions, assess his or her other contributions to panel decisions, evaluate these
opinions and contributions honestly and thoroughly, and produce a concise
report that gives a comprehensive view of the nominee's body of work as a
whole. The problem is that such an assessment would be too expensive, even
in the context of a specific nominee for a Supreme Court vacancy. But this
Article argues that such laborious, costly work already has been done by the
experts who know the candidates and their work best - the judge's colleagues
on the bench. Other appellate judges evaluate precedent every day and en-
code their evaluation into their citations to other judges' work product. In
turn, these evaluations themselves are cited and therefore evaluated in later
opinions, with the evaluation encoded in a positive, negative, or neutral cita-
tion. The only remaining task is to decode the data.
B. The More General Objection to Judicial Rankings
The three types of objections to citation analysis described above each
have some relevance to the citation-count approach, and each is mitigated to
some degree by the additional information supplied by the approach in this
study.162 But one thing all of these objections have in common is that they
relate to using the rankings for Supreme Court nomination and confirmation -
the primary focus of Choi and Gulati's approach.163 But the task of Supreme
Court appointments is not the only, or even the primary, reason one might
want to evaluate appellate judges. This section attempts to explain why ap-
pellate judges are especially good candidates for quantitative assessment.
The idea of rankings, especially rankings of judges, seems to make legal
scholars uneasy. There are, to be sure, serious problems of measurement in
assessing judicial performance, and one has to be mindful of the potential
perverse consequences of such quantification, which have been amply cata-
logued in the references cited above. But as Choi, Gulati, and Posner point
out:
[T]he same measurement difficulty exists in many employment
settings - doctors, nurses, lawyers, bankers, architects, policemen,
baseball umpires, etc. - and employees in these professions are
regularly evaluated by their employers. If employers can measure
the performance of those professionals, why should the public not
be able to measure the performance ofjudges? M
162. See supra Part V.A.
163. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 5.
I64. Stephen J. Choi et al., Are Judges Overpaid? A Skeptical Response to the
Judicial Salary Debate, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 47, 64 (2009).
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There is nothing particularly special about evaluating judges, and the
problems of evaluating performance and the incentives created thereby are
ubiquitous. Employees are regularly evaluated in both public and private
sector employment, and every employee evaluation scheme is imperfect,
overlooking positive behavior, failing to detect undesirable behavior, and
creating incentives to emphasize the observable aspects of performance even
when the unobservable aspects are more important. In this respect, there is
nothing special about judges.
There are some special characteristics about federal appellate judges,
however, although most of them actually argue in favor of applying quantita-
tive empirical approaches to assess their work. The work performed by ap-
pellate judges is uniquely suited to quantitative study, because federal appel-
late judges are a large group of high-level government employees who all do
approximately the same job. Of course, the Senate and House of Representa-
tives largely fit that description and have themselves been the subject of ex-
tensive quantitative analysis, but there is an additional reason to use quan-
titative data to assess the performance of federal appellate judges. Most
judges, unlike members of Congress, purport to be doing something objective
- following the law. When members of Congress are out-voted, people say
the majority disagreed with them. When a trial court is reversed, however,
people say it was wrong. If appellate judges purport to perform an objective
function when reviewing lower courts, then they should be evaluated in ob-
jective terms.
C. Some Criticisms Not Addressed by This Study
There are many potential criticisms of citation studies that this study
does not address. Two in particular, however, arise frequently and share
common underlying features, so they are addressed here. The first common
criticism of not only citation studies but also of all empirical studies of judi-
cial decision-making is the failure to distinguish between "important" cases
and "ordinary" cases.' 66 This study treats the garden-variety ERISA case the
same as the titillating substantive due process case. The cases are weighted in
the data according to how often they arise in judicial citations, not according
to how much debate they provoke in law review articles. This means that the
weight of each case in the analysis reflects the extent to which the opinions
are useful to federal judges in deciding cases, not the extent to which they are
interesting to law professors.
Although some commentators might see this emphasis as a weakness, it
was, in fact, a deliberate choice in the design of this study. The purpose of
this Article is to assess the quality of the average or typical published opinion
165. E.g., KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL-CALL VOTING (1997).
166. Bybee & Miles, supra note 74, at 1060.
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rendered by a judge, not the high-profile case that is already adequately scru-
tinized by legal scholars and the press. Of course, this study could easily be
adapted to emphasize controversial cases by subsetting the data into cases
with a dissenting opinion, for example. Such cases would tap more directly
into the ideological nature of decision-making, as the scope of the data would
be limited to cases in which there is already disagreement. But such an ap-
proach likely would not measure judicial quality as well as that used in this
study and accordingly must be left for future research on judicial ideology.
A second common criticism of citation studies is actually the opposite of
the first: that the study relies too exclusively on published opinions, when
most dispositions in the federal courts of appeals are unpublished. 167 This
study, like the existing citation-count studies, uses only published opinions.
But one might quite justifiably argue that published opinions are a biased
sample of all federal court decisions and therefore are not representative of
the whole corpus of federal judicial output. It is possible that judges might
hold back their lower quality opinions, which could bias the study. It is also
possible that the published opinions reflect only the more significant opi-
nions, which may also be the more controversial ones. In either case, the
sample is not representative of the underlying population of legal cases.
This latter criticism is a valid one, and it reveals a general problem with
empirical studies of the federal courts. Nevertheless, the criticism only ap-
plies when one is attempting to draw inferences about the underlying popula-
tion of case dispositions in the federal system, not when one is attempting to
draw inferences about the precedents created in those dispositions. Indeed,
the very idea of a study of citations to unpublished opinions is, in a sense, a
contradiction in terms, because unpublished decisions are generally not cita-
ble as precedent.' 68 Thus, to the extent one wishes to study the quality of the
legal reasoning that forms part of the body of precedent for later cases, the
unpublished decisions are not relevant. However, to the extent that one wish-
es to draw inferences about the dispositions of individual cases by the federal
courts, citation analysis may prove less useful than other techniques.
D. Examples of Applications
The measures developed in this Article have a number of applications in
both politics and scholarly research. One application has already been men-
tioned, that the measures can serve as one piece (although an important piece)
of information in nomination and confirmation to the Supreme Court. If used
for this purpose, the measures in this study should be used together with other
quantitative data (such as the Choi and Gulati studies) and qualitative infor-
167. See, e.g., Edwards & Livermore, supra note 75, at 1922-27.
168. New Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 modifies this rule. See FED.
R. APP. P. 32.1. The extent to which this new rule will have practical changes in
citation practices remains uncertain.
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mation that bears more directly on integrity, temperament, collegiality, and
the like.
In addition to nomination and confirmation of justices, however, the
measures developed in this Article can provide tools for analyzing research
and policy questions that otherwise might elude quantitative analysis. Some
research questions would use the measures of judicial quality directly as the
explanatory variables of interest, as would the question of whether the Su-
preme Court grants certiorari more often when low- uality judges are on the
panel than when high-quality judges are on the panel. Other research ques-
tions would use the quality ratings as control variables when attempting to
isolate the effect of other causal factors, such as the effect of ideology on
decision-making. Although most of these questions must be left for future
research, this Article briefly outlines two illustrations of how these measures
can inform debates about the federal judiciary. First, this section examines
the implications of this study for the endless debate about whether ideology
affects the decisions of courts of appeals judges. Second, it shows how this
study can have implications on questions of judicial administration, such as
the question of splitting the Ninth Circuit.
1. Ideology and Quality in the Courts of Appeals
The ideological variables in this model suggest that ideology (as meas-
ured by party of nominating president) does play a role in the citation of cas-
es; judges appointed by Democrats cite those appointed by Republicans more
negatively than they cite those appointed by Democrats, and the opposite is
true. The effect is highly statistically significant in each category, but the
effects are relatively small compared to the inside-circuit effects and even
some of the individual judge coefficients. To the extent that the party of the
appointing president captures ideology, these measures suggest that party
plays a smaller role than inside-circuit precedent and even plays a smaller
role than judicial quality in most cases. These findings are consistent with
those of Frank Cross's comprehensive empirical analysis of the federal appel-
late courts, where he concludes that ideology has a statistically significant
effect but a relatively modest role in the decisions of the courts of appeals.170
169. Landes, Lessig, and Solimine say this is so, suggesting the possibility that
the Supreme Court rarely takes cases decided by our top-ranked judges
because these judges not only get things "right" but their decisions are
more likely to be followed in other circuits. But when the Court takes a
case by a topranked [sic] judge, it is more likely to reverse his decision in
order to prevent the "error" from spreading to other circuits.
Landes et al., supra note 7, at 325-26. This is an "open question." Cross & Lind-
quist, supra note 18, at 1404.
170. See CROSS, supra note 132, at 38 (concluding that although "[tihe results are
fairly consistent in showing some effect of ideology that is typically a statistically
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Of course, the party of the appointing president is a highly imperfect measure
of ideology, so the results establish a floor for the degree of partisanship in
appellate citations, not a ceiling.171 Although this finding is very robust, it is
essentially nothing more than a rehashing of the interminable law-political
science debate about whether law or ideology affects judicial decision-
making. In the federal appellate courts, the answer is both.
The results do support some novel and interesting findings about ideol-
ogy. Recall that one of the key assumptions in this Article is that inside-
circuit and outside-circuit citations are both useful for ascertaining the effects
of judicial quality and ideology. This stems from a mild skepticism about the
constraining force of precedent in guiding appellate decisions. In contrast,
Choi and Gulati (echoing Landes et al. before them) emphasize outside-
circuit citations on the ground that inside-circuit citations will be dictated by
precedent and therefore will not be as useful for differentiating among
judges.172 If precedent constrains judges' ability to favor well-reasoned opi-
nions within the same circuit, we would expect that precedent would also
constrain the effect of partisanship and ideology; but comparing the political
party coefficients of columns 2 and 4 with 3 and 5, respectively, we see that
political party matters about the same amount in inside-circuit and outside-
circuit citations. It would appear that to the extent precedent constrains with-
in the circuit, it does not constrain ideology.
To take a closer look at this phenomenon, consider the results of the first
(panel-based) model where the party variables are replaced by a simple varia-
ble for whether the citing case and the cited case were of the same party or
different parties and how that variable interacts with the "inside-circuit" vari-
able for each circuit. The results of this model are presented in Table VII.
Table VII. Ideology by Circuit
Variable Coefficient P-Value
Same Party 0.02 0.000
Eleventh Circuit citing Fifth Circuit 0.108 0.000
First Circuit 0.103 0.000
Second Circuit 0.049 0.000
Third Circuit 0.086 0.000
Fourth Circuit 0.134 0.000
Fifth Circuit 0.129 0.000
Sixth Circuit 0.159 0.000
Seventh Circuit 0.094 0.000
Eighth Circuit 0.118 0.000
significant association. . .. the measured effect size for ideology is always a fairly
small one").
171. Although, the use of exclusively published opinions in this study may over-
estimate the degree of ideological disagreement if published opinions differ systemat-
ically from unpublished ones along this dimension, as Judge Edwards contends. See
Edwards & Livermore, supra note 75, at 1950.
172. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 5; Landes et al., supra note 7.
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Ninth Circuit 0.063 0.000
Tenth Circuit 0.14 0.000
Eleventh Circuit 0.121 0.000
D.C. Circuit 0.058 0.000
Eleventh Circuit citing Fifth Circuit * Same Party -0.002 0.913
First Circuit * Same Party -0.003 0.82
Second Circuit * Same Party -0.011 0.27
Third Circuit * Same Party -0.035 0.007
Fourth Circuit * Same Party 0.004 0.823
Fifth Circuit * Same Party -0.006 0.451
Sixth Circuit * Same Party -0.006 0.565
Seventh Circuit * Same Party 0.019 0.056
Eighth Circuit * Same Party 0.017 0.14
Ninth Circuit * Same Party 0.027 0.001
Tenth Circuit * Same Party 0.001 0.917
Eleventh Circuit * Same Party 0.002 0.902
D.C. Circuit * Same Party 0.004 0.747
The key information is in the first variable (Same Party) and the bottom
half of the table, where the interaction effects are listed. The coefficient on
Same Party shows quite clearly that citations are more positive when the cit-
ing panel and the cited panel are of the same party. That much is consistent
with the existing literature. The second half of the table, however, shows that
in most circuits, political party has the same effect on inside-circuit citations
as outside-circuit citations. This is a surprising finding, because one might
expect partisanship to be dampened in the context of inside-circuit citations
where precedent (or at least the threat of en banc review) should constrain.
Even more surprising is that in the Ninth Circuit, the effect of party is even
stronger on inside-circuit citations than outside-circuit citations. Only in the
Second and Third Circuits are inside-circuit citations significantly less parti-
san in nature than outside-circuit citations. In most circuits, there may be a
slightly greater influence of party on inside-circuit citations, although no oth-
ers rise to the level of statistical significance.
How does this finding square with the idea that precedent is binding
within a circuit, and what are the implications for judicial quality? The evi-
dence suggests a somewhat troubling state of affairs where partisanship is not
significantly mitigated in most circuits, even when precedent should be a
constraint. The implications of this puzzling phenomenon for the relationship
of precedent to ideology must await further research, but the implications of
this finding are clear for researching judicial quality: if ideological differenc-
es are able to persist in inside-circuit citations despite the constraining force
of precedent, it seems even more likely that differentials in judicial quality
are able to withstand that force. Indeed, even when the data are limited to
inside-circuit citations, there is a considerable spread in judicial quality esti-
mates. Thus, this evidence confirms the decision to use inside-circuit as well
as outside-circuit citations to assess quality.
The measures of ideology used in this Article are rough approximations,
however, which means that the analysis cannot control completely for the
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effects of ideology. As a result, it is possible that the quality measures are to
some extent influenced by ideological differences among the judges. Several
of the responses to Choi and Gulati raised this concern, which was expressed
by one comment as follows:
If, as many argue is the case, the federal judiciary is becoming in-
creasingly conservative, then conservative judges may have higher
citation rates simply because they have more like-minded col-
leagues on the bench than their liberal counterparts. If this is the
case, citation counts may be a systematically biased measure:
judges in the ideological majority will always tend to be cited more
often, and thus win this round of the tournament.173
This response goes on to argue that Choi and Gulati's approach may suf-
fer from this problem: "As it turns out, when we compared citation ranks and
political party we found that the published opinions of judges appointed by
Republican presidents are cited significantly more often [than] those written
by Democratic appointees."17 4 Indeed, Choi and Gulati themselves found a
similar result in later work on judicial bias. 175
The problem of potential bias would apply equally to this study, but in
many cases, there is a rather simple and elegant solution. The key issue pre-
sented by the bias problem is that the measures of ideology are not perfect, so
that some of the conservative discount applied to liberals and some of the
liberal discount applied to conservatives seeps into the quality ratings. This
means that the quality of judges as evaluated by the opposite party is some-
what too low and that the quality of judges as evaluated by the same party is
somewhat too high. This is a problem where, as the quote above asserts,176
the ideological balance of the judiciary is lopsided. But it also means that the
true quality ranking should lie somewhere between the score given by judges
of the opposite party and the score given by judges of the same party. By
choosing judges who are ranked relatively high and who are ranked similarly
by judges of both parties, the two scores converge on one another, offering
the double benefit of identifying a candidate who is not very ideological and
for whom the quality rankings are free from this potential ideological conta-
mination.17 7
173. Workshop on Empirical Research in the Law, supra note 9, at 174.
174. Id. at 174-75.
175. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 108; Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Rank-
ing Judges According to Citation Bias (As a Means to Reduce Bias), 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1279 (2007).
176. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
177. Note that Choi and Gulati's method could use an analogous approach for
their ranking system as well. In fact, the authors perform this analysis for Judge
Posner in a follow-up piece. Choi & Gulati, supra note 113, at 35-36 (noting that
Judge Posner is highly cited by both Republicans and Democrats).
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This possibility leads to the final columns of Table II, which provide
rankings for each judge by Democratic panels only (column 8) and Republi-
can panels only (column 9). A survey of these columns reveals that in the
vast majority of cases, the rankings by each party correspond to the expected
ideology of the judges listed. There are a few judges whose rankings seem to
be reversed, which should be expected in noisy data that results from using
panels on which each judge is only one participant. Although these ideologi-
cal measures seem correct in most cases, there is insufficient data to make
definitive conclusions about particular judges' ideologies.
The technique of ranking judges separately by party is designed to avoid
the problem of ideological bias and to look for judges who have high biparti-
san rankings. A judge who satisfies the bipartisan criterion would have a
high ranking (i.e., a low number) in both column 8 and column 9. Consider
again then-Judge Sotomayor in Table II, who is the seventeenth judge listed
in the table. She falls into this ideal category, receiving a high positive rank-
ing from Democrat and Republican panels alike. Then-Judge Sotomayor, a
Democratic nominee to the Second Circuit, is ranked thirty-first by Demo-
cratic panels and twenty-fifth by Republican panels - nearly identical, high
ratings. Thus, not only do we know that Justice Sotomayor was highly res-
pected during her time on the Second Circuit, we also know that this high
ranking is not the result of ideological distortion.
In contrast, consider two judges at the opposite extreme, one from each
political party. Judge Stephen Reinhardt, nominated by Democrat Jimmy
Carter, received a score of 299 from Democratic panels and a score of 380
from Republican panels. Judge Andrew Kleinfeld, nominated by Republican
George H.W. Bush, has almost the same discrepancy (with the opposite ideo-
logical interpretation), receiving a score of 381 from Democratic panels and a
score of 294 from Republican panels. Indeed, Judge Kleinfeld has been iden-
tified by Professor Erwin Chemerinsky as something of a conservative coun-
terpart of Judge Reinhardt, a hypothesis this study seems to confirm.
These three judges illustrate a proposition pointed out above - that judges
with large ideological differentials (Reinhardt and Kleinfeld) have difficulty
climbing into the higher rankings, while those with small ideological diffe-
rentials (Sotomayor) have the potential to reach the top of the list.
The example of Judge Reinhardt is a telling one, as he tends to stand out
in one way or another in most rankings. Cross and Lindquist, for example,
found in their reversal rate ranking that Judge Reinhardt had the worst rating
and interpreted that as a reason to be cautious about their ranking. 79 They
178. Chemerinsky, supra note 27, at 2-3 ("Conservative judges such as Diarmuid
O'Scannlain and Andrew Kleinfeld are just as conservative as [J]udges Reinhardt and
Pregerson are liberal."). Although the data do seem to suggest that Judge Kleinfeld is
the Republican Judge Reinhardt, Judge O'Scannlain appears to be less ideological and
of higher quality than does Judge Pregerson, possibly undermining Chemerinsky's
comparison somewhat.
179. Cross & Lindquist, supra note 18, at 1414.
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wrote that "we suspect that few would regard [Judge Reinhardt] as clearly the
worst circuit court judge sitting on the bench" and noted that "[h]is outside
circuit citations in the Choi and Gulati study exceeded the median."' 80 But,
as noted above, the real reason for being cautious about reversal rate rankings
is the tiny sample size, not that the outcomes do not correspond to what most
academics think about judges.' However, it is noteworthy that when Cross
and Lindquist conduct their alternative "clusterin " evaluation of judges,
Judge Reinhardt still finds himself alone in a cluster. 82
This study confirms that Judge Reinhardt is indeed among the most ne-
gatively cited judges on the federal appellate bench, a distinction he probably
would not be terribly surprised or offended by. Judge Reinhardt's unabashed
emphasis on doing justice as he sees it is in some ways analogous to Judge
Posner's unabashed emphasis on pragmatic results or economic efficiency.
Just as Judge Posner's law and economics approach to the law does not ap-
peal to all judges, neither does Judge Reinhardt's freewheeling approach to
the law appeal to all judges. Both are well known and highly cited among
academics, but neither has embraced traditional legal reasoning as his metho-
dological approach in deciding cases.
2. Ninth Circuit Reforms
The techniques developed in this Article could also shed light on broad
questions of reform of judicial administration, such as the many proposals to
split or otherwise reorganize the Ninth Circuit that have surfaced over many
years. In 1997, Congress created a commission to investigate restructuring
the boundaries and administration of the Courts of Appeals, including a poss-
ible split of the Ninth Circuit.184 The Commission recommended against a
split but did recommend a restructuring into regional "adjudicative divi-
sions." 185 Central to the debate was whether the Ninth Circuit had "grown to
a point that it [could not] function effectively."' 86 Of course, this criterion of
effective functioning presupposes some measure of what "functioning effec-
tively" entails, the development of which is one of the principal goals of this
paper.
There are many types of quantitative data that one can use to ascertain
how well a circuit functions. For example, the Commission looked at data
such as the number of dispositions relative to cases filed, the number of oral
arguments, the time from filing to disposition, and reliance on visiting judges
180. Id
181. See supra Part II.A.
182. Cross & Lindquist, supra note 18, at 1428.
183. COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS,
FINAL REPORT 33-34 (1998).
184. Id at 1.
185. Id. at iii.
186. Id at ix.
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from other circuits. This type of information is certainly relevant in eva-
luating the productivity or efficiency in the circuit, but information of this
type does not explain anything about the quality of the circuit's products - the
decisions and opinions generated by the circuit. Indeed, the quality and un-
iformity of the circuit's legal decisions, which translate into the "consistency
and predictability of the law" in the Commission's language, are very diffi-
cult to evaluate using traditional approaches, and indeed the Commission did
not have enough time to conduct a "statistically meaningful analysis."1 One
oft-recited statistic that is designed to address this issue is the rate at which
the Ninth Circuit is reversed by the Supreme Court, but, as many commenta-
tors have pointed out, the reversal rate by itself may tell very little about the
quality of the circuit, because the Supreme Court itself is arguably ideologi-
cally biased.'89 Thus, one is left without an objective means to evaluate the
functioning of one circuit relative to another, at least if one is unwilling to
equate quantity of decisions with quality.
This Article's analysis is well suited to addressing these types of ques-
tions, and the results suggest the Ninth Circuit may indeed have some serious
problems. The Ninth Circuit is the most negatively cited circuit in the United
States, in terms of the ranking of its judges by outside-circuit citations, as
illustrated in Table VIII below.
Table VM. Judge Quality by Circuit: Outside-Circuit Citations Only
Median Mean Judge Number of Sitting
Circuit Judge Quality (Active and
Quality Senior) Judges*
First 0.036 0.045 10
Second 0.032 0.034 22
Third 0.030 0.034 21
Fourth 0.034 0.032 14
Fifth 0.027 0.029 22
Sixth 0.031 0.023 29
Seventh 0.035 0.028 15
Eighth 0.035 0.036 20
Ninth 0.016 0.018 48
Tenth 0.039 0.034 22
Eleventh 0.037 0.035 17
D.C. 0.032 0.031 14
* According to the Federal Judicial Center. Retrieved from
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj on July 4, 2009.
187. Id. at 39 n.92.
188. Id. at 39.
189. See, e.g., Cross & Lindquist, supra note 18, at 1404 ("[T]he Court's frequent
reversal of a particular judge's decisions might reflect nothing more than ideological
incompatibility between the Court's majority and the judge or opinion under re-
view."); Richard A. Posner, Is the Ninth Circuit Too Large? A Statistical Study of
Judicial Quality, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 711, 712 (2000) (arguing that "reversals by the
Supreme Court often involve disagreement rather than the correction of error").
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The low performance of the Ninth Circuit might be expected by those
who have read the Landes et al. study, but what might not be expected is that
the low performance does not seem to be ideologically based. An initial ob-
jection to this result would be that the lopsided partisan makeup of the appel-
late courts in favor of Republican appointees might make the perceived left-
leaning Ninth Circuit look worse. In contrast, the data in this Article suggests
that neither part of that statement is true. First, even if one restricts the data
to citing panels with a majority of Democrats, the Ninth Circuit is still by far
the worst in the proportion of negative versus positive citations. Moreover,
judges appointed by both Republican and Democratic presidents, on average,
do not see Ninth Circuit judges very differently; if one compares the average
rankings for Ninth Circuit judges in columns 8 (ranking by Democrats) and 9
(ranking by Republicans), there is only a slight difference between the two
(average rank 219 by Democrats and average rank 232 by Republicans). This
gap is smaller than that of several other circuits and much smaller than that of
the Third Circuit (average rank 202 by Republicans and 152 by Democrats).
Finally, and contrary to what is often asserted, the low performance of the
Ninth Circuit also is not solely or even mostly the result of the Democratic
judges in the Circuit - the Republican judges are as equally represented in the
bottom half of the Circuit as the Democratic judges.
The data reveal strong evidence that the work product of the Ninth Cir-
cuit is not well regarded by federal judges in other circuits, a result consistent
with the Landes et al. study. 190 The purported left-leaning ideology of the
Ninth Circuit, however, is not the explanation for this low performance, al-
though ideological disagreement (left and right alike) might have something
to do with it. As discussed in Part V.D. 1 above, the Ninth Circuit is an ideo-
logically driven circuit, which cannot bode well for producing a coherent
body of case law. But another possibly related explanation is indeed the tra-
ditional one of circuit size, as suggested by Table VIII. 191 In the table, there
appears to be a trend of negative performance associated with larger circuits,
which is consistent with what Judge Posner and many others have argued.' 92
Of course, the fact that there seems to be a relationship between circuit size
and circuit quality does not mean that splitting a circuit would improve any-
thing. But it does at least provide some leverage on the policy question of
whether the Ninth Circuit needs reform.
190. Landes et al., supra note 7, at 303-04, 318.
191. Note that the figures given in Table VIII are for current circuit size, which
may not be representative of the weighted circuit size over the period covered by this
study. Ideally, the latter measure would be used.
192. Posner, supra note 189.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The results of this study suggest that the vast majority of federal appel-
late judges are doing good work, or at least that most of them are seen by one
another as performing consistently at approximately the same level. The data
strongly suggest that there are a handful of high-performing judges with a
very positively regarded work product. The data also suggest that there is a
relatively small group of judges whose work product is regarded quite nega-
tively. The data also reveal that the majority of judges are indistinguishable
from one another in terms of the quality of their work product, suggesting a
significant degree of uniformity. This finding is similar to how Choi and
Gulati's results have been interpreted - that their "main result" is that "most
federal judges perform roughly equally."1 93
The judges at the high end of the scale tend to be well regarded by col-
leagues appointed by presidents of both political parties. In contrast, the
judges at the low end are all over the map, some of whom are negatively cited
by both parties and some of whom have divergent ratings by party. This sug-
gests that there are at least two factors at work in the mix of positive and neg-
ative citations - ideology and quality - and that both high quality and ba-
lanced ideology are necessary to reach the highest levels. Thus, contrary to
the claims sometimes made in political science, the courts of appeals are not
solely or even primarily driven by ideology but are greatly influenced by
quality. 195 However, contrary to the claims made by some legal scholars and
judges,196 judicial ideology is a significant determinant in judicial decision-
making for a large number, but probably a minority, of federal appellate
judges.
193. Bybee & Miles, supra note 74, at 1067-68.
194. It is also possible that quality and ideology are two alternative qualifications
that presidents take into account. See, e.g., David C. Vladeck, Keeping Score: The
Utility of Empirical Measurements in Judicial Selection, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1415,
1426 n.47 (2005) ("My intuition is that judges appointed mainly because of their
partisan views maintain that approach on the bench and more reliably vote in a parti-
san manner, while judges selected mainly for their merit, but are viewed as ideology
safe, tend to put ideology aside far more often.").
195. Judge Selya pointed out that "[i]n a ranked list, someone has got to wind up
at the bottom." Selya, supra note 151, at 1296 (suggesting that being ranked at the
bottom (which Judge Selya definitely is not) may not mean much). Although that is
true, it is somewhat misleading; there is a difference between being ranked last with
minute differences from the penultimate judge and being ranked last with a significant
difference from the adjacent judge. The latter situation is what we have in this study.
Although the middle of the pack is statistically indistinguishable, the bottom is clearly
the bottom.
196. Probably the most notable judicial opponent of ideological explanations of
judging is Judge Harry Edwards of the D.C. Circuit. See Harry T. Edwards, Colle-
giality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1998).
381
67
Anderson: Anderson: Distinguishing Judges
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
MISSOURI LA WRE VIEW
The observation that ideology appears to play a role in the quality and
uniformity of judicial output should not obscure the relative contributions of
ideology and quality in the federal judiciary, however. There is indeed an
ideological effect in the decision to distinguish or follow precedents, both
within and between circuits. But the ideological effect, at least as that effect
is measured by political party, appears to weigh much less in the decision
than the quality of the panel that produced the precedent or the judge who
wrote the opinion. Thus, while ideology is a significant factor for some
judges, it is not the most important factor for the majority of judges.
The measures of judicial performance developed in this Article are in-
tended to serve as an important - perhaps even a necessary - component in
evaluating appellate judges, but not as the sole criterion, whether in the con-
text of Supreme Court nominations, judicial administration, or scholarly re-
search on the judiciary. Indeed, the quantitative information on productivity
provided by the citation-count studies, as well as more traditional statistics on
caseload, backlog, and the like, provide indispensable complements to the
results presented here. Although those studies can measure productivity,
prestige, and even influence, they do not directly measure the average quality
of judicial output. Similarly, although this study can measure average quality
of judicial output, it cannot measure productivity. This study indicates that
both types of measures are necessary to gain a full picture of performance in
the federal judiciary.
The approach taken in this Article, like the other citation studies, is par-
ticularly important to evaluating judges because the data used - citations to
judicial opinions - engage directly with the reasoning in the cases, rather than
relying on outcome measures such as votes on dispositions. As Choi and
Gulati point out, the use of citations rather than votes allows the analysis to
penetrate inside the reasoning of and precedent created by opinions, not just
the outcomes.' 97 But using positive and negative citations has the additional
advantage of allowing a seamless interface between judicial rankings and the
creation of "good law," as opposed to expansive theory. If a case has been
criticized and distinguished more than followed, the case is often described as
"bad law," or at least as "against the weight of authority." The virtue of this
study is that judges are evaluated using the same criteria that is used to eva-
luate cases as precedent.
Still, there are many aspects to good judging, and this study only meas-
ures some of them. Even those who embrace Choi and Gulati's quantitative
perspective say there are "multiple types of judges with multiple types of
virtues and shortcomings, with no one type clearly preferable to others." 98
This does not mean, however, that good judging cannot be quantified - the
problem then is one of balancing different dimensions of judging. These
197. Choi & Gulati, supra note 175, at 1281, 1289.
198. Cross & Lindquist, supra note 18, at 1414.
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various virtues and shortcomings are apparent to other judges, so why not let
them do the balancing? This study attempts to do just that.
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